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Abstract
We develop a model of preference aggregation where people’s psychologi-
cal characteristics are mutable (hence, potential objects of individual or social
choice), their preferences may be incomplete, and approximate interpersonal
comparisons of well-being are possible. Formally, we consider preference aggre-
gation when individual preferences are described by an incomplete, yet interper-
sonally comparable, preference order on a space of psychophysical states. Within
this framework we characterize three preference aggregators: the ‘Suppes-Sen’
preorder, the ‘approximate maximin’ preorder, and the ‘approximate leximin’
preorder.
Most models of preference aggregation or welfare aggregation1 make the following
assumptions:
(i) Each person has complete preferences (or a complete personal welfare ordering)
over the space of social alternatives.
∗I am grateful to O¨zgu¨r Evren, Klaus Nehring, Efe Ok, and Clemens Puppe for their helpful
comments on early drafts of this paper. I am especially grateful to Marc Fleurbaey, Franz Dietrich,
and two anonymous referees for their many detailed and valuable comments. None of these people
are responsible for any errors or deficiencies which remain. The final work on this paper was done
while visiting the Universite´ de Montre´al Department of Economics; I thank the UdeM and CIREQ
for their hospitality. This research was also supported by NSERC grant #262620-2008.
1Some theories of justice aggregate the preferences of the individuals (either their ‘declared pref-
erences’, or ‘revealed preferences’, or ‘informed preferences’, or ‘laundered preferences’, etc.). Other
theories reject ‘preferencism’ and seek to aggregate some measure of the ‘welfare’ of individuals, such
as pleasure/happiness (hedonism) or ‘life satisfaction’. Still other theories reject both ‘preferencism’
and ‘welfarism’, an instead focus on some richer, more nuanced, and perhaps objective measure of
well-being, such as Sen’s (1985,1988) ‘capabilities’ approach. This paper is compatible with any of
these approaches. For simplicity and concreteness, I will generally speak in terms of ‘welfare’ and
‘preference’ aggregation —but this does not imply a commitment to any flavour of ‘welfarism’ or
‘preferencism’.
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(ii) Each person has fixed psychological characteristics. Changes in her psychology
are not part of the space of social alternatives. (We cannot change her prefer-
ences, or the psychological factors which influence her sense of well-being).
(iii) Either there is no possibility of interpersonal comparisons of well-being (Ar-
row, 1963, for example), or there exist complete interpersonal comparisons of
some specific welfare information (e.g. ordinal level comparisons, cardinal unit
comparisons, etc.; see d’Aspremont and Gevers (2002) for example).
A companion paper (Pivato, 2010a) has developed a model of ‘approximate’ interper-
sonal welfare comparisons, which relaxes these assumptions. In that model, there is a
space Φ of ‘personal physical states’ and a space Ψ of ‘personal psychological states’,
and each individual in society is characterized by an ordered pair (ψ, φ) ∈ Ψ × Φ.
Both the physical state φ and the psychological characteristics ψ of each person are
mutable, and hence potential objects of individual or social choice. People have (pos-
sibly incomplete) preferences over Ψ × Φ, which encompass not only their current
psychological type, but also perhaps other ‘nearby’ psychological types (thus allowing
for ‘metapreferences’ such as ‘I wish I could enjoy Shostakovich symphonies’, or ‘in-
tertemporal’ comparisons such as ‘I’m glad I’m not as anxious as I used to be’). This
obviously requires some minimal degree of interpersonal comparability. Pivato (2010a)
goes further, and assumes that ‘approximate’ interpersonal welfare comparisons are
possible between any two psychological types (i.e. any two possible individuals in so-
ciety). ‘Approximate’ means that there is some incomplete preorder ( ) on the space
Ψ × Φ of all possible psychophysical states. The statement (ψ1, φ1) (ψ2, φ2) means
that psychophysical state (ψ1, φ1) is objectively better than (or would be universally
preferred to) state (ψ2, φ2).
The present paper develops a model of preference aggregation based on an in-
complete, yet interpersonally comparable, preference order. Its original intended ap-
plication was the preference model of Pivato (2010a), but the framework is general
enough to encompass other preference models as well. The underlying philosophy is
quite similar to that of Sen (1970a, 1972 and Ch.7* of 1970b), Fine (1975), Blackorby
(1975), Basu (1980, Ch.6), and Baucells and Shapley (2006, 2008). The difference is
that these authors consider a generalized utilitarian social welfare order on a fixed, fi-
nite population, defined using (approximately comparable) cardinal or ‘quasi-cardinal’
utility functions. In contrast, this paper considers a variety of social welfare orders,
defined on a variable, possibly infinite population, and using only ordinal preference
data. Also, the models of Sen et al. only relax assumption (iii) in the above list,
whereas this paper simultaneously relaxes all three assumptions.2
2Levi (1986) has also argued that social orders must be incomplete, if they encompass the plurality
of factors influencing individual welfare, and the plurality of (often conflicting) preferences, values,
and conceptions of justice found in a diverse society. However, he does not specifically single out
the ambiguity of interpersonal comparisons. Fishburn (1974), Barthe´le´my (1982), and Pini et al.
(2009) have also considered the aggregation of a profile of incomplete individual preference orders
into an incomplete social order; each obtained weakened versions of the classic impossibility theorems.
However, these results assume there is no interpersonal comparability, so they are unrelated to the
model developed in this paper.
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 introduces terminology and notation.
Section 2 introduces a general model of incomplete interpersonal preferences. Section
3 introduces a model of preference aggregation called a social preorder, and defines
three specific social preorders: the Suppes-Sen preorder (§3.1), the approximate max-
imin preorder (§3.2), and the approximate leximin preorder (§3.3). The Suppes-Sen
preorder is a subrelation of every other social preorder (Proposition 3.3). The ap-
proximate leximin is a strong Pareto refinement of the approximate maximin preorder
(Proposition 3.6).
Sections 2 and 3 only utilize (incomplete) preference orders, not utility functions.
Section 4 illustrates the model in the special case of interpersonal utility comparisons,
and Section 5 applies this special case to bilateral bargaining. Section 6 briefly inves-
tigates other axioms which may be desirable for social preorders, such as separability
and Arrovian independence. Finally, Section 7 turns to ‘metric’ social orders, which
are defined using a ‘multiutility representation’ of the underlying system of incom-
plete interpersonal preferences. The main result of this paper (Theorem 7.10) shows
that the approximate maximin preorder is maximally decisive within the class of met-
ric preorders which ensure ‘minimal equity’, while being decisive between all ‘fully
comparable’ pairs of worlds (the smallest class for which one could reasonably require
decisiveness). This can be seen as a generalization of a classic result of Roberts (1980).
Appendix A provides some technical background on preorders. Appendix B contains
the proofs of all results.
1 Preliminaries
Let X be a set. A preorder on X is a binary relation () which is transitive and
reflexive, but not necessarily complete or antisymmetric. A complete order is a preorder
() such that, for all x, y ∈ X , either x  y or y  x. (For example, a social welfare
order (SWO) is a complete order on RI .) The symmetric factor of () is the relation
(≈) defined by (x ≈ x′) ⇔ (x  x′ and x′  x). The antisymmetric factor of ()
is the relation (≻) defined by (x ≻ x′) ⇔ (x  x′ and x′ 6 x). If neither x  x′
nor x′  x holds, then x and x′ are incomparable; we then write x≻6≺ x′. If (
1
)
and (
2
) are two preorders on X , then (
2
) extends (
1
) if, for all x, x′ ∈ X , we
have (x
1
x′) =⇒ (x
2
x′). It follows that (x≈
1
x′) =⇒ (x≈
2
x′), while (x≻
2
x′) =⇒
(either x≻
1
x′ or x≻6≺
1
x′). (For example, every social welfare order extends the Pareto
preorder on RI . Also, every preorder is extended by the ‘trivial’ preorder where
x ≈ x′ for all x, x′ ∈ X ). We say (
2
) refines (
1
) if, for all x, x′ ∈ X , we have
(x≻
1
x′) =⇒ (x≻
2
x′) and (x≈
1
x′) =⇒ (x
2
x′ or x
2
x′). That is: every pair of
elements which is comparable under (
1
) remains comparable under (
2
), and the
antisymmetric part of (
2
) extends the antisymmetric part of (
1
). (Thus, if x≈
2
x′,
then either x≈
1
x′ or x≻6≺
1
x′.) For example, the ‘leximin’ SWO refines the ‘maximin’
SWO (see Example 7.1 below). Finally, we say that (
1
) and (
2
) have the same
3
scope if for all x, x′ ∈ X , we have (x≻6≺
1
x′) ⇐⇒ (x≻6≺
2
x′). That is: (
1
) and (
2
)
can compare exactly the same elements of X , although they may disagree about the
ordering of these elements. (For example: any two complete orders have the same
scope.) See Appendix A for more discussion of extension, refinement, and scope.
2 Incomplete Interpersonal Preferences
Let X be a set of ‘personal psychophysical states’. An element x ∈ X encodes all
information about an individual’s psychology (i.e. her personality, mood, knowledge,
beliefs, memories, values, desires, etc.) and also all information about her personal
physical state (i.e. her health, wealth, physical location, consumption bundle, sense-
data, etc.).3 Any person, at any moment in time, resides at some point in X .
Let () be an (incomplete) preorder on X . The relation x  y means that it
is objectively better to be in psychophysical state x than in psychophysical state y.
Note that this allows for some degree of interpersonal comparability: states x and y
might represent psychologically different individuals (i.e. different people), as well as
representing different physical conditions. 4 The preorder () can be incomplete for
several reasons:
• Not all interpersonal comparisons may be possible. In some cases, the psycholo-
gies of x and y may be so different that it is not possible to say which person is
better off. At one extreme, if we assume that no interpersonal comparisons are
possible, then we would have x≻6≺ y whenever x and y represent psychologically
distinct persons. (In particular, this would imply that you cannot make ‘in-
tertemporal’ comparisons between your present self and your past/future selves).
At the opposite extreme, if we assume that all interpersonal comparisons are pos-
sible, then () would be a complete ordering —in this case it is philosophically
similar to the extended preference orders considered by Arrow (1963, 1977), Sup-
pes (1966), (Sen, 1970b, Ch.9*, p.152), (Harsanyi, 1977, §4.2, p.53) and others.
• Even if x and y represent the same psychological state (i.e. ‘the same person’),
we may have x≻6≺ y because our definition of welfare makes them incomparable.
For example, suppose we adopt a ‘multi-objective’ conception of welfare, such
as Sen’s (1985, 1988) ‘functionings and capabilities’ approach. There is still no
consensus on the best way to define a complete ordering over all ‘functioning
vectors’. If the functioning vector x dominates the functioning vector y in every
3Unlike Pivato (2010a), this model does not assume it is possible to cleanly separate someone’s
‘psychological’ state from her ‘physical’ state. Indeed, if the mind is a function of the brain, then her
psychological state is simply one aspect of her physical state.
4Note that part of the ‘physical state’ encoded by each x ∈ X is sense-data, which in particular
encodes the person’s perception of other people. Thus, preferences over X can encode ‘other-regarding’
preferences such as altruism, sympathy, antipathy, envy, spite, etc. Also, part of the ‘psychological
state’ encoded by x is the person’s memory of how the current state came to be. Thus, preferences
over X can encode ‘process-regarding’ preferences, which are sensitive to whether the current state
came about through a fair procedure).
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dimension, then it seems unambiguous that x ≻ y. However, if each of x and
y is superior to the other in some dimensions, then we may regard them as
incomparable. If x and y do not represent functionings, but rather, ‘capabilities’
(i.e. sets of functioning vectors) then the problem is even more complex. If y is
a subset of x, or y is clearly much ‘smaller’ than x according to some criterion
(e.g. a collection of measures), then clearly x ≻ y; but if neither x nor y contains
the other, and they are roughly the same size, then we may again regard them
as incomparable.
Indeed, even the individual herself may not be able to completely order the
alternatives which confront her. Incompleteness in her true preference order
can arise from irresolvable internal value conflicts or non-probabilistic uncer-
tainty due do incomplete information and/or cognitive constraints (Levi, 1986).
Incompleteness in revealed preference can arise due to ‘menu-dependent’ choice
behaviour, which often arises in social situations or ethical dilemmas (Sen, 1997).
Note that the statement “x ≻ y” does not represent one person’s subjective opinion
that psychophysical state x is better than state y —it is not the ‘extended sympathy’
of some hypothetical individual, so that some people may think x ≻ y while others
believe x ≺ y. Instead, “x ≻ y” means that it is an objective fact that x is better
than y. It may seem as though we are ‘cheating’ by assuming away the heterogeneity
of preferences which necessitates social choice theory in the first place. But recall that
an element x ∈ X encodes all the psychological information which defines someone’s
identity —in particular, all factors which determine her preferences, her emotional
response to various situations, her ‘capacity for happiness’, etc. In short, all psycho-
logical heterogeneity is already encoded in the space X . See (Pivato, 2010a, §1) for
more discussion.
3 Social Preferences
Let I be a finite or infinite5 set (representing a population). Any social alternative
can thus be described as a vector x ∈ X I which assigns a psychophysical state xi to
each i ∈ I. Let’s say x is regular if there exists some j ∈ I such that xi 6≺ xj for all
other i ∈ I. (If I is finite, then every x ∈ X I is regular —‘regularity’ is nonvacuous
only if I is infinite.) If σ : I−→I is a permutation, and x ∈ X I , then we define
σ(x) := x′, where x′i := xσ(i) for all i ∈ I. A ( )-social preorder is a (generally
incomplete) preorder (D ) on X I which satisfies three axioms:
(Par1) For any x,y ∈ X I , if xiyi for all i ∈ I, then x E y.
(Par2) Also, if either x or y is regular, and xi≺ yi for all i ∈ I, then x ⊳ y.
5An infinite I allows for variable-population social choice models, by including in X a ‘null’ state
x0 representing ‘nonexistence’. Also, an infinite I allows for intertemporal social choice models
involving a potentially infinite sequence of generations.
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(Anon) For all x ∈ X I , if σ : I−→I is any permutation, then x
△
≡ σ(x). (Here,
(
△
≡ ) is the symmetric factor of (D )).
If I is finite, then the ‘regularity’ hypothesis in (Par2) is vacuous; then axioms (Par1)-
(Par2) are equivalent to the standard ‘Weak Pareto’ axiom. To understand why
‘regularity’ is necessary for infinite I, suppose I = Z and suppose x,y ∈ X I are such
that · · · ≺ x−1 ≺ y−1 ≺ x0 ≺ y0 ≺ x1 ≺ y1 ≺ x2 ≺ y2 ≺ · · ·. Thus, xi≺ yi for all
i ∈ I, so axiom (Par2) (without the ‘regularity’ requirement) would say that x ⊳ y.
Define σ : I−→I by σ(i) := i − 1, and let y′ := σ(y). Then for all i ∈ I, we have
y′i = yi−1 ≺ xi, so axiom (Par2) (without ‘regularity’) would say that y
′ ⊳x. But
axiom (Anon) says y′
△
≡ y. Thus, transitivity implies y ⊳x, contradicting the fact
that x ⊳y. If one of x or y is regular, this sort of paradox cannot occur.6
Axiom (Anon) makes sense because the elements of I are merely ‘placeholders’,
with no psychological content —recall that all information about the ‘psychological
identity’ of individual i is encoded in xi. Thus, if x,y are two social alternatives, and
xi 6= yi, then it may not make any sense to compare the welfare of xi with yi (unless
such a comparison is allowed by ( )), because xi and yi represent different people
(even though they have the same index). On the other hand, if xi = yj, then it makes
perfect sense to compare xi with yj, even if i 6= j, because xi and yj are in every
sense the same person (even though this person has different indices in the two social
alternatives).7
If x ∈ X I and J ⊆ I, then define xJ := (xj)j∈J (an element of X
J ). Say that x
is strongly regular if xJ is regular for every J ⊆ I. (Again, if I is finite, then every
x ∈ X I is strongly regular.) We will also consider social preorders which satisfy the
following ‘Strong Pareto’ property:
(SPar) For any x,y ∈ X I , if either x or y is strongly regular, and xiyi for all
i ∈ I, and xi≺ yi for some i ∈ I, then x ⊳ y.
6‘Regularity’ requires the set {xi}i∈I to have a ‘minimal’ element. One could also obtain a
nonparadoxical version of axiom (Par2) by requiring the set {xi}i∈I to have a ‘maximal’ element
(i.e. ∃ j ∈ I : ∀ i ∈ I, xi 6≻ xj). However, this ‘dual’ regularity does not work for the approximate
maximin social preorder in §3.2.
7(Anon) has less normative content than the ‘Anonymity’ axiom in classical preference aggregation
models. Classical Anonymity means that the social evaluation must ignore all personal information
about people except their preferences; it cannot care who holds a certain utility function, but only
that someone does. This sort of ‘anonymity’ is impossible in the present framework, because each
element of X encodes a psychological identity as well as a physical state (indeed, this is crucial to
the model of Pivato (2010a)).
However, axiom (Par1) does indirectly impose a considerable degree of ‘impartiality’ upon
(D ), through Pareto indifference (Lemma 3.1(a)). If two social states x and y generate exactly the
same well-being for each index i in I, then we must have x
△
≡ y, regardless of the psychological
identities of the coordinates of x and y. Furthermore, most of the social preorders in this paper
satisfy the axiom (SPIIA) introduced in §6.2, which imposes a great deal of impartiality in the form
of ‘ordinal welfarism’.
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The following obvious facts are noted for future reference:
Lemma 3.1 (a) (Pareto Indifference) Let (D ) be any ( )-social preorder, and
let x,y ∈ X I. If xi≈yi, for all i ∈ I, then x
△
≡ y.
(b) If {D
λ
}λ∈Λ is a collection of ( )-social preorders (where Λ is some indexing
set), and (D ) is their intersection, then (D ) is also a ( )-social preorder.
3.1 The Suppes-Sen preorder
The Suppes-Sen social preorder8 (D
s
) is defined as follows: for any x,y ∈ X I , xE
s
y
if and only if there is a permutation σ : I−→I such that, for all i ∈ I, xi  yσ(i).
We will see shortly that (D
s
) is the ‘minimal’ ( )-social preorder, which is extended
(and often refined) by every other ( )-social preorder (see Proposition 3.3(b)).
Example 3.2 (Cost-benefit analysis)
Given two social alternatives x,y ∈ X I , let I↓ := {i ∈ I; xi ≻ yi} be the set of ‘losers’
under the change from social alternative x to social alternative y, and let I↑ := {i ∈ I;
xi ≺ yi} be the set of ‘winners’. Let I0 := I \ (I↓ ⊔ I↑) be everyone else. Suppose
that:
• There is a bijection β : I0−→I0 such that, for every i ∈ I0, xi≈yβ(i);
• There is an injection α : I↓−→I↑ such that, for all i ∈ I↓,
xα(i)  yi ≺ xi  yα(i). (1)
Thus, we can pair up every ‘loser’ i in I↓ with some ‘winner’ α(i) in I↑ such that the
gains for α(i) clearly outweigh the losses for i in the change from x to y.
Claim. xE
s
y.
Proof. Define σ : I−→I as follows: σ(i) := β(i) for all i ∈ I0; σ(i) := α(i) for all
i ∈ I↓; σ(i) := α
−1(i) for all i ∈ α(I↓) ⊆ I↑; and σ(i) := i for all other i ∈ I↑\α(I↓).
It remains to show that xi  yσ(i) for all i ∈ I. There are three cases: (1) i ∈ I0;
(2) i ∈ I↓ or i ∈ α(I↓); and (3) i ∈ I↑ \ α(I↓).
(1): If i ∈ I0, then xi ≈ yβ(i) = yσ(i) by definition of β.
(2): If i ∈ I↓ and j = α(i) ∈ I↑, then xj  yi ≺ xi  yj. However, σ(i) = j and
σ(j) = i; hence xi  yσ(i) and xj  yσ(j).
(3): If i ∈ I↑ \ α(I↓), then σ(i) = i and xi ≺ yi; so xi ≺ yσ(i). 2
8This social preorder is based on the grading principle, a partial social welfare order defined by
Suppes (1966) on R2, and extended to Rn by Sen (1970b, §9*1-§9*3, pp.150-156). It was later
named the ‘Suppes-Sen’ ordering by Saposnik (1983), who showed that, on Rn, it is equivalent to
the rank-dominance ordering.
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For example, suppose I = {i, j}, let x,y ∈ X I be two alternatives such that xiyi
while yjxj. Thus, a change from alternative x to y would help Isolde (i) and hurt Jack
(j) —thus, neither alternative is Pareto-preferred to the other. Borrowing Harsanyi’s
well-known example, suppose I have an extra ticket to a Chopin concert which I
can’t use, and let x be the alternative where I give the ticket to Jack, while y is the
alternative where I give the ticket to Isolde. Both Isolde and Jack want the ticket.
However Isolde is a classical pianist and Chopin fanatic who has been complaining
bitterly for months that she couldn’t get a ticket to this sold-out concert, whereas
Jack doesn’t even like classical music; he only wants the ticket because going to any
concert is slightly preferable to spending a boring evening at home. Assume that,
other than the concert issue, Jack and Isolde have roughly similar levels of well-being.
Then we might reasonably suppose that xi  yj  xj  yi. Thus, the change
from x to y helps Isolde more than it hurts Jack, so xE
s
y. (To see this, set I↓ := {j},
I↑ := {i}, and α(j) := i in eqn.(1).) ♦
Even if ( ) was a complete preorder over X , the social preorder (D
s
) would still be
very incomplete over X I . For instance, in Example 3.2, the number of ‘big winners’ in
I↑ must exceed the number of losers (even small losers) in I↓, so that every loser can be
matched up with some ‘big winner’ whose gains outweigh her losses. Thus, (D
s
) would
not recognize the social value of a change x ; y where a wealthy 51% majority I↓
sacrifices a pittance so that destitute 49% minority I↑ could gain a fortune (something
which classic utilitarianism or egalitarianism would recognize). In particular, it is
necessary, but not sufficient, for a clear majority to support the change x ; y; thus,
(D
s
) is less decisive than simple majority vote.
Proposition 3.3 Let ( ) be a preorder on X .
(a) (D
s
) is a ( )-social preorder on X I.
(b) If (D ) is any ( )-social preorder on X I, then (D ) extends (D
s
).
If I is finite, and (D ) satisfies (SPar), then (D ) also refines (D
s
).
Proposition 3.3(b) says that (D
s
) is the ‘minimal’ social preorder, which is extended
by every other social preorder (and also refined by (SPar) social preorders).9 To
select one of these more complete social preorders, we must either introduce additional
normative principles (e.g. equity, decisiveness), or stipulate what kind of utility data
is available (e.g. cardinal vs. ordinal), or both. For example, in §7, we will suppose
the social planner has access to (approximate) ordinal utility data, but she wishes to
be ‘as decisive as possible’ —in particular, she wants a social preorder (D ) which is
complete whenever ( ) is complete (i.e. whenever precise interpersonal comparisons
9Theorems 9*5 and 9*7, and Corollary 9*7.1 of (Sen, 1970b) can be seen as special cases of this
result.
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are possible). Theorem 7.10 says that this, together with an extremely weak ‘equity’
principle, is enough to characterize the ‘approximate maximin’ social preorder, which
is introduced next.
3.2 Approximate maximin
Given a preorder ( ) on X , the ( )-approximate maximin social preorder (D
am
) on X I
is defined as follows: For any x,y ∈ X I ,
(
yD
am
x
)
⇐⇒
(
There is a function ω : I−→I (possibly not injective)
such that, for all i ∈ I, we have yixω(i)
)
.
In other words, for every person i in the social alternative y, no matter how badly
off, we can find some person ω(i) in the social alternative x who is even worse off. In
particular, this means that even the ‘worst off’ people in y (i.e. elements of I which
are ‘minimal’ with respect to ( )) are still better off than someone in x. If ( ) is a
complete ordering on X , then all people in social alternative x are comparable with
all people in y, and (D
am
) is equivalent to the classical ‘maximin’ SWO.
Given x,y ∈ X I , let I↓, I↑, and I0 be as in Example 3.2. We say y is a Hammond
equity improvement over x if
• There is a bijection β : I0−→I0 such that, for every i ∈ I0, we have xβ(i)≈yi;
• There is a injection α : I↓−→I↑ such that, for all i ∈ I↓,
xα(i) ≺ yα(i)  yi  xi. (2)
In other words, we can pair up every ‘loser’ i in I↓ with some ‘winner’ α(i) in I↑
such that Hammond’s (1976) equity condition is satisfied: both before and after the
change, i is better off than α(i), but the change narrows the gap between them.
For example, recall the ‘concert ticket’ story from Example 3.2, but now with a
different scenario. Suppose Isolde and Jack have roughly equally strong desires to
attend the concert. However, Isolde is a miserable, depressed person, whereas Jack is
a happy, contented person. Isolde will be less happy than Jack no matter who gets
the ticket; thus, we have xi  yi  yj  xj. Thus, the change from x to y reduces
inequality, so it is a Hammond equity improvement. (To see this, set I↓ := {j},
I↑ := {i}, and α(j) := i in equation (2).)
A social preorder (D ) is Hammond equity promoting if, for any x,y ∈ X I , we have
xEy whenever y is a Hammond equity improvement over x.
Proposition 3.4 (D
am
) is a ( )-social preorder on X I, and is Hammond equity pro-
moting.
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3.3 Approximate leximin
Like the classical maximin SWO, the approximate maximin preorder (D
am
) violates
the ‘strong Pareto’ axiom (SPar), because it only cares about the worst-off members
of society. Can we repair this deficiency by lexicographically refining (D
am
)? For any
x ∈ X I , define I0(x) := {j ∈ I; xi 6≺ xj, for all i ∈ I}. This set indexes the ‘locally
minimal’ elements of {xi}i∈I .
Lemma 3.5 Let x,y ∈ X I. If x
△
≡
am
y, then for every i ∈ I0(x), there exists some
j ∈ I such that xi≈yj.
If x is regular (e.g. if I is finite), then I0(x) is always nonempty; in this case,
Lemma 3.5 tells us that (D
am
)-indifference between x and y is always due to ( )-
indifferences between some coordinates of x and y. The lexicographical response is to
eliminate these indifferent coordinates, and apply (D
am
) to the remaining coordinates
to break the social indifference. However, if I is infinite, then I0(x) and I0(y) could
be empty; we can have x
△
≡
am
y without any coordinates of x being indifferent to any
coordinates of y. (For example, suppose I = N, and we have an infinite decreasing
sequence x1 ≻ y1 ≻ x2 ≻ y2 ≻ x3 ≻ y3 ≻ · · ·.) In this case, a lexicographical procedure
will not be able to break the social indifference between x and y.
Fix x,y ∈ X I . Let Ix := {i ∈ I; ∃ j ∈ I such that xi≈yj}, and let Iy := {i ∈ I;
∃ j ∈ I such that yi≈xj}. An indifference matching is a triple (Kx,Ky, β), where
Kx ⊆ Ix, Ky ⊆ Iy, and β : Kx−→Ky is a bijection such that xk≈yβ(k) for all k ∈ Kx.
Say (Kx,Ky, β) is maximal if there does not exist any other indifference matching
(K′
x
,K′
y
, f ′), with either Kx ( K
′
x
or Ky ( K
′
y
—in other words, (Kx,Ky, β) ‘covers’
as many of the elements of Ix and Iy as possible. Let
X I∗ :=
⊔
J⊆I
X J .
We extend the relation (D
am
) to X I∗ as follows: for any J ,K ⊆ I and any x ∈ X J
and y ∈ XK, let yD
am
x if there exists a function ω : K−→J such that ykxω(k) for
all k ∈ K. It is easy to check that this relation is reflexive (use the identity map) and
transitive (use function composition), and hence a preorder on X I∗.
We can now define the approximate leximin social preorder (D
alx
) on X I through the
following four step procedure.
1. If x ⊲6 ⊳
am
y, then set x ⊲6 ⊳
alx
y.
2. If x ⊳
am
y, then set x ⊳
alx
y. If x ⊲
am
y, then set x ⊲
alx
y.
3. Otherwise, we have x
△
≡
am
y. Let (Kx,Ky, β) be a maximal indifference matching
of x and y. If Kx = Ky = I then set x
△
≡
alx
y.
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4. Otherwise, let Jx := I \ Kx and Jy := I \ Ky. Let x∗ := (xj)j∈Jx and y∗ :=
(yj)j∈Jy (thus, x∗ ∈ X
Jx and y∗ ∈ X
Jy , so both x∗ and y∗ are elements of X
I∗).
(a) If x∗ ⊲6 ⊳
am
y∗, then set x
△
≡
alx
y.
(b) If neither x∗ nor y∗ is regular, then set x
△
≡
alx
y. (This never occurs if I is
finite.)
(c) Otherwise, if x∗ ⊳
am
y∗, then set x ⊳
alx
y. If x∗ ⊲
am
y∗, then set x ⊲
alx
y.
Proposition 3.6 (a) (D
alx
) is a well-defined ( )-social preorder on X I, which
refines (D
am
) and satisfies axiom (SPar). Also, (D
alx
) and (D
am
) have the same
scope, and (D
am
) extends (D
alx
).
(b) If I is finite and ( ) is a complete preorder on X , then (D
alx
) is the classic
leximin order on X I.
4 Special case: approximate interpersonal compar-
isons of utility10
Let Ψ be a space of ‘psychological types’. Each person is described by her psycho-
logical type ψ ∈ Ψ, and a single real number measuring her ‘well-being’ or ‘utility’.
Thus, X = Ψ × R. We assume that the preorder ( ) is such that (ψ, r1)  (ψ, r2)
whenever r1 ≥ r2 (that is: everyone, always prefers more utility, irrespective of her
psychological type). However, different types have different ‘utility scales’, so given
(ψ1, r1), (ψ2, r2) ∈ Ψ×R, it is not necessarily possible to compare (ψ1, r1) and (ψ2, r2)
if ψ1 6= ψ2. The preorder ( ) on Ψ × R thus encodes an (incomplete) system of
interpersonal comparisons of utility (Pivato, 2010a, §2).
A social alternative is now an ordered pair (ψ, r) ∈ ΨI × RI , which assigns a
psychological type ψi and a utility level ri to every i ∈ I. A social preorder is an
(incomplete) preorder (D ) on ΨI × RI . If we fix ψ and allow r to vary over RI , we
are back in one of the standard frameworks of social choice theory: each social state
defines a ‘utility vector’ r ∈ RI , and we must socially order these utility vectors. The
social preorder (D ) induces a preorder (◮
ψ
) on RI , where, for all r, r′ ∈ RI , we have
r′◮
ψ
r iff (ψ, r′)D (ψ, r).
Example 4.1 Let (D
s
) be the Suppes-Sen preorder from §3.1. For any r, s ∈ RI , we
have s◭
s,ψ
r if and only if there is a permutation σ : I−→I such that, for all i ∈ I,
(ψi, si)  (ψσ(i), rσ(i)). For simplicity, suppose I = {1, 2}, so that we can visualize
( ◮
s,ψ
) as a preorder on R2.
10The material in this section and Section 5 is not required for Sections 6 and 7.
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r2+δ
Upper contour set  Lower contour set
s1 >  r2 + δ  and  s2 >  r1 + δ. 
s1 >  r1  and  s2 >  r2. 
s1 <  r2 - δ  and  s2 <  r1 - δ. 
s1 <  r1  and  s2 <  r2. 
Incomparable region
r
Figure 1: Upper and lower contour sets of the relation ( ◮
s,ψ
) on R2 induced by the Suppes-Sen
preorder (D
s
) in Example 4.1(a). Each contour set contains two overlapping regions, corresponding
to the two possible conditions implying the relation r′ ◮
s,ψ
r (or vice versa).
The social preorder of Example 4.1(b) generates similar pictures: simply replace ‘rj − δ’ with ‘rj/C’
and ‘rj + δ’ with ‘C rj ’ everywhere. The difference between Examples 4.1(a) and (b) is in scaling.
Using the social preorder of Example 4.1(b), if we multiply r by a scalar, we see exactly the same pic-
tures. However, using the social preorder of 4.1(a), if we multiply r by, say, 2, then the ‘incomparable’
region (right) will be only half as wide.
(a) Suppose ψ1 and ψ2 have cardinal utility functions with the same scale (so for
any r < r′ ∈ R, the change from (ψ1, r) to (ψ1, r
′) represents the same ‘increase in
happiness’ for ψ1 as the change from (ψ2, r) to (ψ2, r
′) represents for ψ2). However,
suppose the ‘zeros’ of their utility functions are set at different locations (so (ψ1, 0) is
not necessarily equivalent to (ψ2, 0)), and we do not know precisely where these zeros
are. Formally, suppose is some δ > 0 such that, for all r, s ∈ R we have(
(ψ1, s)≺ (ψ2, r)
)
⇐⇒
(
s < r − δ
)
and
(
(ψ1, s)≻ (ψ2, r)
)
⇐⇒
(
s > r + δ
)
.
(3)
Then for any r, s ∈ R2, s◭
s,ψ
r iff either s1 ≤ r1 and s2 ≤ r2, or s2 < r1 − δ and
s1 < r2 − δ. See Figure 1. Even if δ = 0 (implying perfect interpersonal utility
comparisons) the grey ‘incomparable’ region in Figure 1 would still be quite large; the
Suppes-Sen preorder is inherently a very incomplete social ordering.
(b) Now suppose ψ1 and ψ2 have cardinal utility functions with the same zero point
(so (ψ1, 0) is equivalent to (ψ2, 0) —perhaps being the utility of some ‘neutral’ state,
like nonexistence or eternal unconsciousness). However, the utility functions of ψ1 and
ψ2 have different scales, and we do not know precisely what these scales are. Formally,
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suppose there is some C > 1 such that, for any r, s ∈ R we have(
(ψ1, s) ≺ (ψ2, r)
)
⇐⇒
(
either s ≥ 0 and s < r/C; or s < 0 and s < C r
)
;(
(ψ1, s) ≻ (ψ2, r)
)
⇐⇒
(
either r ≥ 0 and s/C > r; or r < 0 and C s > r
)
;(
(ψ1, s)≈(ψ2, r)
)
⇐⇒
(
s = 0 = r
)
.
Then for any r, s ∈ R2+, s◭
s,ψ
r iff either s1 ≤ r1 and s2 ≤ s2, or s2 < r1/C and
s1 < r2/C. ♦
r
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r
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−
δ
Upper contour sets
r
r 1
r2
r 1
−
δ
r1−δ
r2−δ
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−
δ
Lower contour sets
r
r 1
r2=r1
r 2
+δ
r1+δ
r2=r1
r1−δ
s1 > r1  and  s2 > r1 + δ. 
s2 > r2  and  s1 > r2 + δ. 
s1 > r1  and  s2 > r2.
s1 <  r1  and  s1 < r2 − δ 
s2 < r2  and  s2 < r1 − δ
s1 < r1   and  s2 < r2.
r1=r2
r 2
−
δ
r
r1
r1−δ
Incomparable regions
r2=r1
r1−δ
Egalitarian indifference
curve through r.
r1+δ
r 1
−
δ
r 1
+δ
r
Figure 2: Contour sets for the relation ( ◮
am,ψ
) induced on R2 by approximate maximin preorder (D
am
)
in Example 4.2. Left: the upper contour sets for two choices of r ∈ R2. Middle: the lower contour sets.
Each contour set contains three overlapping regions, corresponding to the three possible conditions
implying the relation r′ ◮
am,ψ
r (or vice versa). Right: The incomparable regions
{
r′ ∈ R2 ; r′ ◮6 ◭ r
}
.
For reference, we also show the indifference curve of the classical maximin SWO.
Example 4.2 Let (D
am
) be the approximate maximin preorder from §3.2. Then for
any r, s ∈ RI , r ◮
am,ψ
s iff there is a function ω : I−→I (possibly not injective) such
that, for all i ∈ I, (ψi, ri) (ψω(i), sω(i)). For simplicity, we again suppose I = {1, 2},
so that we can visualize ( ◮
am,ψ
) as a preorder on R2.
Let δ > 0 and suppose ( ) is defined as in eqn.(3). Then for any r, s ∈ R2, we have
s ◭
am,ψ
r iff either (1) r1 ≤ s1 and r2 ≤ s2; or (2) r1 ≤ s1 and r1 < s2 − δ; or (3)
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δδ
P
P’P’’
B
(A)
B
P
(B)
δ
δ
b 1 
=
 b 2
b 1 =
 b 2
-
δ
b 1 
=
 b 2
+δ
Figure 3: Solving bilateral bargaining problems with social preorders. (A) The Suppes-Sen
bargaining solution wkUnd
(
B, ◭
s,ψ
)
of Example 5.1. (B) The approximate maximin bargaining
solution wkUnd
(
B, ◭
am,ψ
)
of Example 5.2.
r2 ≤ s2 and r2 < s1 − δ. See Figure 2. If δ = 0 (implying perfect interpersonal utility
comparisons), then ( ◮
am,ψ
) reduces to the classic maximin SWO on R2. ♦
5 Application: bilateral bargaining theory
Let B ⊂ R2 be some compact, convex set —for example, the set of feasible utility
profiles in a bilateral bargaining problem. Let P be the Pareto frontier of B. Classic
bargaining solutions prescribe a small (usually singleton) subset of P . Typically, we
fix a (complete) preorder (◮ ) on R2 (e.g. a social welfare order), and select from B
the weakly dominant set
wkDom
(
B, ◮
)
:=
{
b∗ ∈ B ; b∗ ◮ b, ∀ b ∈ B
}
.
(See Appendix A.) Fix ψ ∈ Ψ2, and let (◮
ψ
) be the preorder on R2 from §4. An
incomplete preorder like (◮
ψ
) may not have any weakly dominant points in B. Instead,
the appropriate bargaining solution in this context is the weakly undominated set
wkUnd
(
B, ◮
ψ
)
:=
{
b∗ ∈ B ; b∗ 6◭
ψ
b, ∀ b ∈ B
}
.
Example 5.1 Let ( ◮
s,ψ
) be the Suppes-Sen ordering of Example 4.1. A point b is
weakly undominated in B if and only if: (1) there is no b′ ∈ B which Pareto-dominates
b; and (2) there is no b′ ∈ B such that b1 < b
′
2 − δ and b2 < b
′
1 − δ.
Let P ′ be the reflection of P across the diagonal. Let P ′′ := P ′ − (δ, δ); then b ∈
wkUnd
(
B, ◭
s,ψ
)
if (1) b ∈ P and (2) There is no b′ ∈ P ′′ which Pareto-dominates b.
The set wkUnd
(
B, ◭
s,ψ
)
is shown in Figure 3(A). ♦
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Example 5.2 Let ( ◮
am,ψ
) be the approximate maximin order of Example 4.2. Suppose
B satisfies the ‘No Free Lunch’ (NFL) property: for any p,p′ ∈ P, (p1 < p
′
1)⇔ (p2 >
p′2) (i.e. P contains no vertical or horizontal line segments). Then wkUnd
(
B, ◭
am,ψ
)
=
{b ∈ P ; |b1 − b2| ≤ δ}, as shown in Figure 3(B). (See Appendix B for a proof of
this statement). If δ = 0, then wkUnd
(
B, ◭
am,ψ
)
= {b ∈ P ; b1 = b2}, the egalitarian
bargaining solution. ♦
6 Other axioms11
This section briefly examines some other axioms which may be desirable in a social
preorder, such as separability and Arrovian independence. A social preorder (D ) is
separable if it satisfies the following axiom:
(Sep) Let xEy ∈ X I , and suppose there exists J ⊂ I such that xi≈yi for all
i ∈ I \J . Then the social ordering of x with respect to y is entirely determined
by xJ and yJ . To be precise: if x
′,y′ ∈ X I are any elements such that xJ = x
′
J
and yJ = y
′
J and x
′
i≈y
′
i for all i ∈ I \ J , then x
′
Ey′.
In other words, (D ) ignores ‘indifferent’ individuals when comparing two alterna-
tives. Like the classic maximin SWO, the approximate maximin preorder (D
am
) from
§3.2 violates (Sep). Classically, this is resolved by refining maximin to leximin. Indeed,
the leximin SWO is the unique separable refinement of the maximin SWO. However,
if ( ) is incomplete, then the approximate leximin preorder (D
alx
) of §3.3 does not, in
general, satisfy (Sep). Instead, we have the following impossibility theorem:
Proposition 6.1 Suppose |I| ≥ 3 and there exist a, a′, b, b′, c, c′ ∈ X such that a 
b ≺ c and a′  b′ ≺ c′, but a≻6≺ b′≻6≺ b≻6≺ a′. Then there is no separable ( )-social
preorder which refines (D
am
).
6.1 Implicit interpersonal comparisons
So far, we have followed the standard ‘preference aggregation’ approach to social
choice: begin with a profile of personal preference/welfare orders and some system of
interpersonal comparisons, and ‘aggregate’ this data into a social evaluation. However,
as argued by Hammond (1991) and Fleurbaey and Hammond (2004; §5.1 and §7.7),
this logic can be reversed: we could begin with a social evaluation, derived from some
ethical principles, and then ask what sort of personal preference/welfare orders and
interpersonal comparisons are implicit in this social evaluation.12
11This material is not essential to §7.
12Jeffrey (1971) makes a similar suggestion, but his proposal is confined to deriving cardinal unit
comparability from an exogenously imposed utilitarian SWO.
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Suppose we have a preorder (D ) on X I which satisfies axiom (Anon). Is there a
preorder ( ) on X such that (D ) is a ( )-social preorder? For any x ∈ X , let xI
denote the element y ∈ X I such that yi = x for all i ∈ I. For all x, y ∈ X , define:(
x
∗
y
)
⇐⇒
(
xI D yI
)
. (4)
The relation (
∗
) is then automatically a preorder on X I (it inherits reflexivity and
transitivity from (D )). Intuitively, (
∗
) encodes the interpersonal comparisons ‘im-
plicit’ in (D ): if xIEyI , then this represents a judgement that the personal state x is
no better than the personal state y.
Proposition 6.2 Let (D ) be a preorder on X I satisfying axiom (Anon). For all
x,y ∈ X I, suppose:
(a) if (xi)
I
E(yi)
I for all i ∈ I, then xEy;
(b) if (xi)
I ⊳ (yi)
I for all i ∈ I, and either x or y is regular, then x ⊳y.
Define preorder (
∗
) by formula (4). Then (D ) is a (
∗
)-social preorder.
Proof. By hypothesis, (D ) satisfies (Anon). Conditions (a) and (b) translate imme-
diately into axioms (Par1) and (Par2) with respect to (
∗
). 2
Now, let ( ) be a preorder on X , and suppose (D ) is already a ( )-social
preorder, and we define preorder (
∗
) using (4). Then (
∗
) both extends and refines
( ) (because (D ) satisfies axioms (Par1) and (Par2) with respect to ( )). But
what if (
∗
) strictly extends ( )? Then (D ) implicitly encodes ‘extra’ interpersonal
comparisons which are not justified based on the welfare comparisons embodied in
( ). This is prevented by the axiom of ‘No extra hidden interpersonal comparisons’:
(NEHIC) For any x, y ∈ X , we have
(
xIEyI
)
⇐⇒
(
xy
)
.
All the social preorders we have introduced so far satisfy (NEHIC). In §7, we will
see that (NEHIC) is important to characterize the class of ‘metric’ preorders (see
Proposition 7.4).
6.2 Independence of irrelevant alternatives
The definition of ‘social preorder’ at the beginning of §3 was based on a ‘single-
profile’ framework (i.e. the interpersonal preorder ( ) was fixed), as opposed to
the ‘multiprofile’ framework (with variable personal preferences) of most aggregation
models. However, this impression is misleading, because each element x ∈ X encodes
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detailed psychological information —hence a social alternative x ∈ X I implicitly
encodes a complete psychological description of every member of society, including all
the information which would be encoded by a profile of preference orders or utility
functions in a multiprofile model. Since x is a variable, the social preorder model thus
allows for the same heterogeneity as a traditional multiprofile framework.
Arrow’s Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) is a multi-profile axiom.
Here is a ‘na¨ıve’ translation of IIA into the single-profile language of social preorders:
(NIIA) Let x,y,x′,y′ ∈ X I . Suppose, for all i ∈ I, that (xi yi) ⇐⇒ (x
′
i y
′
i).
Then (xDy) ⇐⇒ (x′Dy′).
Sadly, no social preorder satisfies (NIIA).13 The problem is that (NIIA) only compares
xi with yi. However, i might not be the ‘same person’ in x and y; it may be more
appropriate to compare xi with yj for some j 6= i. But (NIIA) discards this informa-
tion. It also discards all interpersonal comparisons between different coordinates of x,
and between different coordinates of y. In the Arrovian framework, such interpersonal
comparisons are meaningless, but in this paper, they are meaningful and important.
Finally, while it is formally analogous to Arrow’s IIA, axiom (NIIA) actually misses
the point of IIA. The point of IIA is that the social ranking of x versus y should not
depend upon a comparison between x, y, and some third social alternative z ∈ X I .
Hence the social ranking of x and y cannot be altered by expanding or contracting the
menu X of alternatives. This invariance is captured by the following axiom, Single-
Profile Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives:
(SPIIA) Let x,y,x′,y′ ∈ X I . Suppose that, for all i, j ∈ I, we have
(xixj) ⇐⇒ (x
′
i x
′
j), (yi yj) ⇐⇒ (y
′
i y
′
j), and (xi yj) ⇐⇒ (x
′
i y
′
j).
Then (xDy) ⇐⇒ (x′Dy′).
This axiom could also be called ‘Ordinal welfarism’, because it says that the social
ordering of x and y is entirely determined by the interpersonal orderings between the
coordinates of x and the coordinates of y. It is easy to check that the Suppes-Sen,
approximate maximin, and approximate leximin preorders all satisfy (SPIIA). Also,
(SPIIA) =⇒ (NEHIC).
13Proof: Find x,x′ ∈ X I such that all elements of {xi}i∈I ⊔ {x
′
i}i∈I are ( )-incomparable. Let
y := x′ and y′ := x. Then (xi yi) ⇐⇒ (x
′
i y
′
i) for all i ∈ I (i.e. (false) ⇐⇒ (false)). Thus,
(NIIA) says (xDx′) ⇐⇒ (x′Dx). Hence either x
△
≡ x′ or x ⊲6 ⊳x′. It cannot be the case that
x
△
≡ x′ whenever their coordinates are all ( )-incomparable. So, we can find some x,x′ ∈ X I with
x ⊲6 ⊳x′. Now let σ : I−→I be a permutation, and let y := y′ := σ(x). Axiom (Anon) implies x
△
≡ y,
whereas x′ ⊲6 ⊳y′. But again, (xi yi) ⇐⇒ (x
′
i y
′
i) for all i ∈ I (i.e. (false) ⇐⇒ (false)). Thus,
(NIIA) is violated.
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Multiprofile extension. Although it is unnecessary for any of the other results
in this paper, it is possible to extend the notion of social preorder to an explicitly
‘multiprofile’ framework. A preordered set is an ordered pair (X ,  ), where X is a
set and ( ) is a preorder on X . Let P be the collection of all preordered sets. Let
I be a set. Let PI ⊂ P be the set of all ordered pairs (X I , D ), where X is any set
and (D ) is a preorder on X I . An I-social preorder functional (I-SPF) is a function
F : P−→PI such that, for all (X ,  ) ∈ P, if (X I , D ) = F (X ,  ), then (D ) is
a ( )-social preorder on X I . (For example, the Suppes-Sen, approximate maximin,
and approximate leximin social preorders are all defined for any I and any preordered
set (X ,  ); thus each of these can be converted into an I-SPF in the obvious way.)
This yields the following ‘multiprofile’ version of Arrovian Independence:
(MPIIA) Let (X1, 
1
) and (X2, 
2
) be two preordered sets. Let F (X1, 
1
) = (X I1 , D1 )
and F (X2, 
2
) = (X I2 , D2 ). Let x
1,y1 ∈ X I1 and x
2,y2 ∈ X I2 . Suppose:
For all i, j ∈ I, (x1i 1 x
1
j) ⇐⇒ (x
2
i

2
x2j), (y
1
i

1
y1j ) ⇐⇒ (y
2
i

2
y2j ),
and (x1i 1 y
1
j ) ⇐⇒ (x
2
i

2
y2j ). (5)
Then (x1D
1
y1) ⇐⇒ (x2D
2
y2).
Clearly, (MPIIA) =⇒ (SPIIA) [set (X1, 
1
) = (X2, 
2
)]. The Suppes-Sen, approximate
maximin, and approximate leximin SPFs all satisfy (MPIIA).
(MPIIA) is the most natural extension of (SPIIA) to I-SPFs, but it is normatively
questionable. An interpersonal preorder ( ) encodes information about the prefer-
ences and interpersonal comparisons of all possible human beings who could ever exist
in any possible world. Thus, ( ) encodes a complete model of the nature of human
welfare, or what is sometimes poetically called ‘the human condition’. Thus, if we
change ( ) to some other interpersonal order (
∗
) on X , this does not merely repop-
ulate the world with different people having different preferences (as in the Arrovian
model) —it fundamentally changes our underlying model of ‘the human condition’.
Thus, it isn’t normatively compelling to require (MPIIA)-like consistency between
F (X ,  ) and F (X , 
∗
). 14
Nevertheless, (MPIIA) has an interesting translation into the language of category
theory. A (concrete) category consists of a collection C of sets (each perhaps having
some additional structure), and for every C1, C2 ∈ C, a collection MorphC(C1, C2) of
(‘structure-preserving’) functions from C1 into C2, called morphisms. The set of mor-
phisms must be closed under composition: For any C1, C2, C3 ∈ C if α ∈ MorphC(C1, C2)
14Likewise, an I-SPF satisfies the analog of Arrow’s ‘Universal Domain’ (UD) axiom: it is defined
for all elements of P. This means ( ) (i.e. ‘the human condition’) could have any conceivable
structure whatsoever; it is not clear whether this is really necessary.
18
and β ∈ MorphC(C2, C3), then β ◦α ∈ MorphC(C1, C3). Also, for every C ∈ C, the iden-
tity map IdC must be an element of MorphC(C, C). Here are some examples: (1) the
category of all topological spaces and continuous functions; (2) the category of all
vector spaces and linear functions; (3) the category of all groups and group homomor-
phisms. Mac Lane (1998) provides a good introduction to category theory.
Let (X1, 
1
) and (X2, 
2
) be preordered sets. Define a morphism from (X1, 
1
) to
(X2, 
2
) to be a function α : X1−→X2 such that, for all x, y ∈ X1, we have (x y) ⇐⇒
(α(x)α(y)). Then P, together with all these morphisms, forms a category. For any
set I, the class PI is a sub-category of P.
Let C and D be categories. A covariant functor from C to D consists of a function
F : C−→D, together with functions F∗ : MorphC(C1, C2)−→MorphD [F (C1), F (C2)] for
every C1, C2 ∈ C, such that:
• F [IdC] = IdF (C) for all C ∈ C.
• For all α ∈ MorphC(C1, C2) and β ∈ MorphC(C2, C3), F∗[β ◦ α] = F∗[β] ◦ F∗[α].
For any function α : X1−→X2 and any set I, define α
I : X I1 −→X
I
2 by α
I(x) := y
where yi := α(xi) for all i ∈ I.
Proposition 6.3 Let I be a set and let F : P−→PI be an I-SPF. For any (X1, 
1
)
and (X2, 
2
) in P, and any morphism α : X1−→X2, define F∗[α] := α
I. Then
(
F satisfies (MPIIA)
)
⇐⇒
(
F is a covariant functor from P into PI
)
.
7 Metric Social Orders
A utility function for () is a function u : X−→R such that
For all x, y ∈ X ,
(
x  y
)
=⇒
(
u(x) ≤ u(y)
)
(6)
and
(
x ≺ y
)
=⇒
(
u(x) < u(y)
)
. (7)
(Note: Since ( ) is incomplete, the reverse implications do not necessarily hold.) Let
U( ) be the set of utility functions for ( ). A multiutility representation for () is a
subset V ⊆ U( ) such that
For all x, y ∈ X ,
(
x  y
)
⇐⇒
(
v(x) ≤ v(y), for all v ∈ V
)
. (8)
For example, suppose () is separable, meaning there is a countable subset Y ⊆ X
which is dense (i.e. for all x ≺ z ∈ X , there exists some y ∈ Y such that x ≺ y ≺ z);
then ( ) has a multiutility representation (Mandler, 2006, Thm.1). In fact, ( ) has
a multiutility representation whenever U( ) 6= ∅ (Pivato, 2010a, Proposition 3.1).
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A social welfare order (SWO) is a complete preorder (◮ ) on RI satisfying three
axioms:
(Par1◮) For any r, s ∈ RI , if ri ≤ si for all i ∈ I, then r◭s.
(Par2◮) Also, if either r or s is regular, and ri < si for all i ∈ I, then r◭ s.
(Anon◮) If σ : I−→I is any permutation, and r ∈ RI , then r
N
≡σ(r).
(An element r ∈ RI is regular if min
i∈I
(ri) is well-defined. If I is finite, then every r ∈ R
I
is regular.)
Example 7.1 (a) The maximin SWO (◮
m
) is defined as follows. For all r, s ∈ RI ,
we set s ◮
m
r if and only if there is a function ω : I−→I (possibly not injective) such
that, for all i ∈ I, we have si ≥ rω(i).
For example: s ◮
m
r whenever inf
i∈I
(si) > inf
i∈I
(ri) (but not conversely). If I is finite,
then clearly s ◮
m
r if and only if min
i∈I
(si) ≥ min
i∈I
(ri), in accord with the classical
maximin SWO. But if I is infinite, then min
i∈I
(ri) might not be well-defined.
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(b) Suppose I := [1 . . . I]. Let
ր
RI :=
{
r ∈ RI ; r1 ≤ r2 ≤ · · · ≤ rI
}
. For any r ∈
RI , let
ր
r ∈
ր
RI be the element obtained by arranging the entries of r in ascending
order, so that
ր
r1 := mini∈I ri and
ր
rI := maxi∈I ri. For any k ∈ [1 . . . I], the rank k
dictatorship SWO (◮
k
) is defined on RI by s◮
k
r iff
ր
sk ≥
ր
rk. (Thus, (◮
m
) is the rank
1 dictatorship.)
(c) Define the leximin SWO (◮
lex
) as follows: s◮
lex
r iff there is some j ∈ [1 . . . I] such
that
ր
sk =
ր
rk for all k ∈ [1 . . . j), while
ր
sj >
ր
rj. Meanwhile, s
N
≡
lex
r iff
ր
s =
ր
r. ♦
For any x ∈ X I and any function u : X−→R, define u(x) := (u(xi))i∈I ∈ R
I .
Proposition 7.2 Let I be finite, let ( ) be an interpersonal preorder on X , let (◮ )
be a SWO on RI, and let u : X−→R be some function. Define the (complete) preorder
(D
u
) on X I by xD
u
y iff u(x)◮u(y). Then
(
D
u
is a ( )-social preorder
)
⇐⇒(
u ∈ U( )
)
.
Corollary 7.3 Let I be finite, let ( ) be an interpersonal preorder on X , and let
V ⊆ U( ). Let (◮ ) be a SWO on RI, and define the preorder (D
V
) on X I by(
xD
V
y
)
⇐⇒
(
v(x) ◮ v(y), for all v ∈ V
)
. (9)
Then (D
V
) is a ( )-social preorder on X I.
15The ‘obvious’ extension of maximin to infinite I would be the preorder on RI defined by
(s ◮ r) ⇐⇒ (inf
i∈I
(si) ≥ inf
i∈I
(ri)). However, this preorder violates axiom (Par2
◮).
20
Proof. Combine Proposition 7.2 with Lemma 3.1(b). 2
The preorder (9) is well-defined for any nonempty V ⊆ U( ). However, it is more
attractive when ( ) admits a multiutility representation (8). To see this, recall axiom
(NEHIC) from §6.1.
Proposition 7.4 Let ( ) be an interpersonal preorder on X , let V ⊆ U( ), let
(◮ ) be a SWO on RI, and define preorder (D
V
) by statement (9). Then (D
V
) satisfies
(NEHIC) if and only if V provides a multiutility representation (8) for ( ).
The set U( ) contains many utility functions, which could yield different, contra-
dictory social preorders in Proposition 7.2. Corollary 7.3 mitigates this problem by
requiring ‘unanimity’ over some ‘representative sample’ V of utility functions. What
constitutes a representative sample? The most conservative choice would be to set
V = U( ). Thus, for any SWO (◮ ) on RI , the ( , ◮ )-metric16 preorder (D ) is
defined as follows: for all x,y ∈ X I ,(
xDy
)
⇐⇒
(
u(x)◮u(y), for all u ∈ U( )
)
. (10)
If I is infinite, then the preorder (9) is not always a social preorder (it could violate
axiom (Par2)). The metric preorder (10) offers some advantage in this setting.
Proposition 7.5 Let ( ) be an interpersonal preorder on X , with U( ) 6= ∅. For
any set I and any SWO (◮ ) on RI, the ( , ◮ )-metric preorder (10) is a ( )-social
preorder on X I.
What are necessary or sufficient conditions for a social preorder to be metric? Let’s
begin with a necessary condition. For any x,y,x′,y′ ∈ X I , write (x,y) ∼= (x′,y′) if
there exist u, u′ ∈ U( ) such that u(x) = u′(x′) and u(y) = u′(y′). Consider the
following ‘consistency’ axiom:
(C) For any x,y,x′,y′ ∈ X I , if xEy ∈ X I and (x,y) ∼= (x′,y′), then x′ 6 ⊲ y′.
16What I am calling ‘metric’ is analogous to formal welfarism (Sen, 1970b; d’Aspremont and Gevers,
2002, §3.3.1, p.489-494): the social ordering is entirely determined by the individual’s utility functions
(or in this case, a multiutility representation). However, the term ‘welfarism’ also has a much more
philosophically loaded meaning: the premise that ethical judgements should be entirely driven by
hedonic or preference data, and should be insensitive to any richer or more nuanced view of human
well-being. As emphasized in footnote #1 and §2, and also in (Pivato, 2010a, §1), the interpersonal
preorder ( ) is compatible with a variety of conceptions of individual well-being, ranging from simple
hedonism to a multidimensional ‘capabilities’ approach. This remains true even if ( ) admits a
multiutility representation (8). Thus, I eschew the term ‘welfarism’ and its philosophical baggage,
and instead use the term ‘metric’. This captures the idea that the social ordering is driven by some
quantitative ‘measurements’ of well-being (i.e. a multiutility representation), without endorsing any
particular conception of what ‘well-being’ means.
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Let r := u(x) and s := u(y). If xEy, this implicitly suggests that the utility bundle
s is socially preferable to the utility bundle r. Axiom (C) says we cannot find some
x′,y′ ∈ X I and u′ ∈ U( ) which implicitly suggest exactly the opposite conclusion.
The next result is easily proven:
Lemma 7.6 Suppose U( ) 6= ∅. If (D ) is any ( )-metric preorder (or is extended
and refined by a ( )-metric preorder), then (D ) satisfies axiom (C).
Later, we shall see that axiom (C), together with a minimal ‘decisiveness’ property,
is also sufficient to imply that (D ) is extended by a metric preorder (Theorem 7.10(a)).
First, let’s consider ‘metric’ versions of two preorders introduced in §3.
Let (◮
m
) be the maximin SWO, and let (◮
lex
) be the leximin SWO from Examples
7.1(a,c). Define the metric leximin social preorder (D
mlx
) to be the (, ◮
lex
)-metric social
preorder. What about the (, ◮
m
)-metric social preorder? Recall the approximate
maximin and approximate leximin preorders (D
am
) and (D
alx
) from §3.2 and §3.3.
Proposition 7.7 Suppose U( ) 6= ∅.
(a) The (, ◮
m
)-metric social preorder is (D
am
).
(b) If I is finite, then (D
alx
) extends and refines (D
mlx
).
In general, a ( )-social preorder (D ) will be a very incomplete preorder on X I .
We want (D ) to be as complete as possible, so the social planner can make deci-
sions. The major obstruction, of course, is that ( ) itself may be incomplete, for
the reasons mentioned in §2. But given a sufficiently comprehensive mechanism for
adjudicating tradeoffs between the welfare of different individuals, this should be the
only obstruction.
Say that x,y ∈ X I are fully ( )-comparable if the set {xi}i∈I ∪ {yi}i∈I is totally
ordered by ( ). (For example, suppose x and y are ‘clone worlds’, where all in-
dividual are ‘clones’ of a single psychological type, and differ only in their physical
circumstances. If this psychological type has complete preferences over her physical
circumstances, then x and y are fully ( )-comparable.) Say that a ( )-social
preorder (D ) is minimally decisive if x and y are (D )-comparable whenever they are
fully ( )-comparable. Thus, any incompleteness in (D ) is due to the underlying in-
completeness of ( ) (e.g. the difficulty of interpersonal comparisons), and not simply
because (D ) is unable to make nontrivial tradeoffs between the utilities of different
individuals (like the Suppes-Sen preorder of §3.1).
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Example 7.8 The approximate maximin preorder (D
am
) (see §3.2) is minimally de-
cisive. To see this, suppose x1 and x2 are fully ( )-comparable. Then there exists
some m ∈ {1, 2} and some j ∈ I such that xmj  x
n
i for all (n, i) ∈ {1, 2}×I. Suppose
m = 1, and define ω : I−→I by ω(i) = j for all i ∈ I; then we have x1ω(i) = x
1
j  x
2
i
for all i ∈ I; hence x1E
am
x2. ♦
We will now see that very few metric preorders are minimally decisive, and among
these, only the approximate maximin preorder (D
am
) has a desirable ‘equity’ property.
To explain this, suppose x1,x2,x3 ∈ X I are fully ( )-comparable. The rank structure
of the triple (x1,x2,x3) is the complete order (⋗) on {1, 2, 3} × I defined as follows:
for all n,m ∈ {1, 2, 3} and i, j ∈ I, (n, i)⋖(m, j) if and only if xnix
m
j . We will require
the following axiom of ‘minimal richness’ for ( ):
(MR) For any complete order (⋗) on {1, 2, 3}×I, there exist fully ( )-comparable
x1,x2,x3 in X I whose rank structure is (⋗).
This is a very mild condition, which is satisfied by almost any collection of preferences.
For example, consider a person who has strictly increasing preferences over wealth (or
any other quantifiable commodity). If X contains representations of this person at
more than 3|I| distinct wealth levels (e.g. with 1 dollar, with 2 dollars, ...., with
3|I| dollars), then ( ) satisfies (MR). (Let x1,x2,x3 be ‘clone worlds’ where all
individuals are ‘clones’ of this one person; we can assign the clones various levels of
wealth to obtain any desired rank structure.)
We will also use the following axiom of ‘Minimal Charity’:
(MinCh) There exist x,y ∈ X I and i ∈ I such that:
(ch1) xi ≺ yi  yj ≺ xj for all j ∈ I \ {i}; and
(ch2) xEy.
This is a very weak equity condition. (MinCh) merely requires there to exist one
situation (perhaps very extreme) where it is socially preferable for the more fortunate
members of society to help its least fortunate member at some small cost to themselves
—it does not require this to hold under all situations.
Example 7.9 (Hammond Equity) Let I = [1 . . . I], and let x1 ∈ X I be such that
x11≺ x
1
i for all i ∈ [2 . . . I], so individual 1 (‘Juan’) is the unhappiest person in the
world. Suppose we can construct a sequence of worlds x2,x3, . . . ,xI such that, for all
i ∈ [2 . . . I], we have xi−11 ≺ x
i
1  x
i
i ≺ x
i−1
i , while x
i
1 ≺ x
i
j≈x
i−1
j for all j ∈ I \ {1, i}.
Thus, the transition xi−1 ; xi is a Hammond equity improvement, but it still leaves
Juan the unhappiest in the world. (For example: person i gives Juan a single penny.)
If (D ) is any Hammond equity promoting social preorder [e.g. (D
am
) or (D
alx
)], then
x1Ex2E · · ·ExI . Thus, if x := x1, y := xI , and i := 1, then (MinCh) is satisfied. ♦
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Let I := |I| be finite. For any k ∈ [1 . . . I], let (◮
k
) be the rank-k dictatorship
SWO from Example 7.1(b). Define the rank k dictatorship social preorder (D
k
) to be
the (, ◮
k
)-metric social preorder. Thus, Proposition 7.7(a) says the approximate
maximin preorder (D
am
) is just (D
1
). We now come to the main result of this paper.
Theorem 7.10 Let I be finite. Let ( ) be an interpersonal preorder on X which
satisfies (MR), with U( ) 6= ∅. Let (D ) be any ( )-social preorder on X I satisfying
axiom (C) (e.g. a metric social order).
(a) If (D ) is minimally decisive, then it is extended by (D
k
) for some k ∈ [1 . . . I].
(b) If (D ) is minimally decisive and satisfies (MinCh), then (D
am
) extends (D ).
(c) (D ) satisfies (MinCh) and has the same scope as (D
am
) if and only if (D )
refines (D
am
).
(d) (D ) extends (D
am
) if and only if (D ) is identical with (D
am
).
Example 7.11 (a) Consider the approximate leximin preorder (D
alx
) from §3.3. It has
the same scope as (D
am
) by construction, and satisfies (MinCh) by Example 7.9. Thus,
Theorem 7.10(c) says (D
alx
) refines (D
am
), in agreement with Proposition 3.6(a)
(b) Consider the metric leximin preorder (D
mlx
) defined prior to Proposition 7.7. It is
minimally decisive (Lemma B.4 in the Appendix) and satisfies (MinCh). If xE
mlx
y, then
u(x)◭
lex
u(y) for all u ∈ U( ), so u(x)◭
m
u(y) for all u ∈ U( ), so xE
am
y. Thus, (D
am
)
extends (D
mlx
), as predicted by Theorem 7.10(b). ♦
Let SPC( ) be the set of all ( )-social preorders satisfying axiom (C), and con-
sider the partial order relation “⊆” on SPC( ) (i.e. (D
1
) ⊆ (D
2
) iff (D
2
) extends
(D
1
)). Theorem 7.10(d) says that (D
am
) is strictly (⊆)-undominated in SPC( ), while
Theorem 7.10(b) says that (D
am
) is strictly (⊆)-dominant over the set of minimally
decisive and minimally charitable elements of SPC( ).
Let Y ⊂ X I be some set of ‘feasible’ alternatives, and suppose the social planner
wishes to find the (D )-optimal alternative in Y . Appendix A (below) discusses four
different concepts of ‘optimality’ for incomplete preorders. If (D ) ∈ SPC( ) is mini-
mally decisive, and minimally charitable, then wkDom
(
Y , D
)
⊆ wkDom
(
Y , D
am
)
and
strUnd
(
Y , D
am
)
⊆ strUnd
(
Y , D
)
(by Theorem 7.10(b) and Lemma A.1(g)[i] below).
In particular, if there is a strictly (D
am
)-dominant alternative y in Y , then y is the
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only possible weakly (D )-dominant alternative in Y . On the other hand, any strictly
(D
am
)-undominated alternative is also strictly (D )-undominated.
Suppose further that Y is small enough that (D ) is a complete ordering when
restricted to Y . Then (D
am
) is also complete on Y (by Lemma A.1(c)), and hence
(D ) refines (D
am
) (by Theorem 7.10(c)). Thus, strDom
(
Y , D
am
)
⊆ strDom
(
Y , D
)
⊆
wkUnd
(
Y , D
)
⊆ wkUnd
(
Y , D
am
)
(Lemma A.1(g)[ii]). In particular, any bargaining
solution proposed by (D ) must be a subset of the approximate maximin bargaining
solution described in Example 5.2 and portrayed in Figure 3(b).
Conclusion
Preference aggregation is still possible when psychologies are mutable, people have
incomplete preferences, and only approximate interpersonal comparisons are possible.
In particular, this applies to the model of approximate interpersonal comparisons de-
veloped by Pivato (2010a). This paper works in an ‘ordinal’ framework (where the
only role of a utility function is to represent some underlying preference order), so its
main result (Theorem 7.10) can be seen as a generalization of the classic characteri-
zation of the maximin SWO in the setting of (complete) ordinal level comparability.
Two other companion papers (Pivato, 2010b,c) consider the aggregation of incom-
plete, interpersonal preferences encoding cardinal welfare information; this leads to
‘approximate utilitarian’ social preorders. Aside from the Suppes-Sen, approximate
maximin, approximate leximin, and approximate utilitarian preorders, what other
social preorders have natural characterizations in the setting of approximate interper-
sonal comparisons?
Appendix A: Extension, refinement, and optimality
in incomplete preorders
Let X be a set and let ( ) be a (possibly incomplete) preorder on X . Say that ( )
is antisymmetric (or ‘strict’) if, for all x, y ∈ X , we have (x  y  x) ⇔ (x = y). A
linear order is an antisymmetric, complete preorder.
There are four distinct notions of ‘optimality’ for incomplete preorders. We define:
strDom (X ,) := {x∗ ∈ X ; x∗ is strictly dominant: x∗ ≻ x, ∀ x ∈ X \ {x∗}};
wkDom (X ,) := {x∗ ∈ X ; x∗ is weakly dominant: x∗  x, ∀ x ∈ X};
strUnd (X ,) := {x∗ ∈ X ; x∗ is strictly undominated: x∗ 6 x, ∀ x ∈ X \ {x∗}};
wkUnd (X ,) := {x∗ ∈ X ; x∗ is weakly undominated: x∗ 6≺ x, ∀ x ∈ X}.
Thus, strDom (X ,) = wkDom (X ,) ∩ strUnd (X ,)
⊆ wkDom (X ,) ∪ strUnd (X ,) ⊆ wkUnd (X ,) . (11)
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All four of these optimal sets can be empty. If X is finite, then wkUnd (X ,) is
always nonempty; even then, each of the other three sets can be empty. Clearly
strDom (X ,) 6= ∅ if and only if wkDom (X ,) is a singleton set, in which
case strDom (X ,) = wkDom (X ,). If ( ) is complete, then strDom (X ,) =
strUnd (X ,) and wkDom (X ,) = wkUnd (X ,). If ( ) is antisymmetric, then
strDom (X ,) = wkDom (X ,) and strUnd (X ,) = wkUnd (X ,). If ( ) is linear,
then all four sets are equal.
Let (
1
) and (
2
) be two partial orders on X . Recall that (
2
) extends (
1
) if,
for all x, x′ ∈ X , we have (x
1
x′) =⇒ (x
2
x′). Likewise, (
2
) refines (
1
) if, for all
x, x′ ∈ X , we have (x≻
1
x′) =⇒ (x≻
2
x′), while (x≈
1
x′) =⇒ (x
2
x′ or x
2
x′). If (
2
)
extends and refines (
1
), then for all x, x′ ∈ X , we have
(
x
1
x′
)
=⇒
(
x
2
x′
)
and
(
x≻
1
x′
)
=⇒
(
x≻
2
x′
)
. (12)
The next result clarifies the logical relationships between these concepts.
Lemma A.1 Let X be a set and let {
λ
}λ∈Λ be a collection of preorders on X .
(a) Let (
∗
) be the intersection of {
λ
}λ∈Λ. Then (
∗
) is also a preorder on X .
For every λ ∈ Λ, the preorder (
λ
) extends (
∗
) (but doesn’t necessarily refine
it).
(b) Let ( ) be a preorder on X , and suppose that, for every λ ∈ Λ, the preorder
(
λ
) extends and refines ( ). Then (
∗
) also extends and refines ( ).
(c) Let (
1
) be a complete order on X , and let (
2
) be another preorder.
(
(
2
) either extends or refines (
1
)
)
=⇒
(
(
2
) is also a complete order on X
)
.(
(
2
) extends and refines (
1
)
)
=⇒
(
(
2
) is identical with (
1
)
)
.
(d) Let (
1
) and (
2
) be two preorders on X with the same scope (for example:
two complete orders on X ). Then(
(
2
) extends (
1
)
)
⇐⇒
(
(
1
) refines (
2
)
)
.
(e) Let (
1
) and (
2
) be antisymmetric preorders on X . Then
(
(
1
) extends (
2
)
)
⇐⇒
(
(
1
) refines (
2
)
)
.
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(f) Let (
1
) and (
2
) be linear orders on X . Then
(
(
1
) extends (
2
)
)
⇐⇒
(
(
1
) refines (
2
)
)
⇐⇒
(
(
1
) is identical with (
2
)
)
.
(g) Let (
1
) and (
2
) be any preorders on X . [i] If (
2
) extends (
1
), then
wkDom
(
X , 
1
)
⊆ wkDom
(
X , 
2
)
and strUnd
(
X , 
2
)
⊆ strUnd
(
X , 
1
)
.
[ii] If (
2
) refines (
1
), then
strDom
(
X , 
1
)
⊆ strDom
(
X , 
2
)
⊆ wkUnd
(
X , 
2
)
⊆ wkUnd
(
X , 
1
)
.
Proof. (a) is clear from the definition.
(b) Let x, y ∈ X . If x  y, then x
λ
y for all λ; and thus, x
∗
y.
Suppose x ≺ y. Then x
λ
y for all λ; and thus, x
∗
y; we must show that x 6
∗
y. By
contradiction, suppose x
∗
y. Then x
λ
y for all λ, which means x  y, contradicting
the hypothesis that x ≺ y.
(c) If (
2
) either extends or refines (
1
), then every pair in X which are (
1
)-comparable
are also (
2
)-comparable; hence if (
1
) is complete then (
2
) is also complete. The
second implication in (c) then follows from statement (12).
(d) “=⇒” Suppose x≺
2
y. Either x
1
y or x
1
y, or both (because (
1
) has the same
scope as (
2
)). But if x
1
y, then x
2
y (because (
2
) extends (
1
)); this contradicts
the fact that x≺
2
y. Thus, we must have x
1
y and not x
1
y; hence x≺
1
y, as desired.
On the other hand, if x≈
2
y, then x
1
y or x
1
y (because (
1
) has the same scope
as (
2
)).
“⇐=” Suppose x
1
y. Either x
2
y or x≻
2
y (because (
2
) has the same scope as
(
1
)). But if x≻
2
y, then x≻
1
y (because (
1
) refines (
2
)); this contradicts the fact
that x
1
y. Thus, we must have x
2
y, as desired.
(e) “=⇒” Let x 6= y. If x≺
2
y, then x
2
y; hence x
1
y (because (
1
) extends (
2
)); hence
x≺
1
y (because x 6= y and (
1
) is antisymmetric).
“⇐=” Let x 6= y. If x
2
y, then x≺
2
y (because x 6= y and (
2
) is antisymmetric);
hence x≺
1
y (because (
1
) refines (
2
)); hence x
1
y.
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(f) If (
1
) either extends or refines (
2
), then (e) says that (
1
) both extends and
refines (
2
); then the second implication in (c) implies that (
1
) is identical with
(
2
).
(g)[i] If (
2
) extends (
1
), then ∀ x, x∗ ∈ X , (x∗
1
x) ⇒ (x∗
2
x), while (x∗ 6
2
x) ⇒
(x∗ 6
1
x).
(g)[ii] If (
2
) refines (
1
), then ∀ x, x∗ ∈ X , (x∗≻
1
x) ⇒ (x∗≻
2
x), while (x∗ 6≺
2
x) ⇒
(x∗ 6≺
1
x). 2
Appendix B: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 3.3. Let x,y, z ∈ X I .
(a) Transitive. Suppose xE
s
y and yE
s
z. Then there exist permutations σ, τ : I−→I
such that, for all i ∈ I, we have xiyσ(i) and yizτ(i). Thus, τ ◦ σ : I−→I is also a
permutation, and xizτ(σ(i)) for all i ∈ I; hence xE
s
z.
(Par1) Suppose xi  yi for all i ∈ I. Let σ : I−→I be the identity map. Then xi  yσ(i)
for all i ∈ I; hence xE
s
y.
(Par2) Suppose xi ≺ yi for all i ∈ I. From (Par1) we know that xE
s
y. To show that
x ⊳
s
y, we must show that x 6D
s
y. By contradiction, suppose xD
s
y; then there is
some permutation σ : I−→I such that xσ(i)  yi for all i ∈ I.
Suppose x is regular. Find j ∈ I such that, xi 6≺ xj for all other i ∈ I. But if
i := σ−1(j), then xj  yi≻xi, so xj ≻xi; contradiction.
Now suppose y is regular. Find j ∈ I such that, yi 6≺ yj for all other i ∈ I. But
if i := σ−1(j), then yj ≻xj  yi, so yj ≻ yi; contradiction.
(Anon) Suppose y = σ(x) for some permutation σ : I−→I. Then xi ≈ yσ(i) for all i ∈ I.
Thus, x
△
≡
s
y.
(b) Suppose xE
s
y. We must show that xEy. Let σ : I−→I be a permutation such that
xi  yσ(i) for all i ∈ I. Then xEσ(y)
△
≡ y. (Here “
△
≡ ” is by (Anon) and “E” is by
(Par1), because xi  yσ(i) all i ∈ I.) Thus, xEy by transitivity.
Suppose (D ) also satisfies (SPar), and suppose x ⊳
s
y. We must show that x ⊳y.
Let σ : I−→I be a permutation such that xi  yσ(i) all i ∈ I. We must have xi ≺
yσ(i) for some i ∈ I, because if xi ≈ yσ(i) for all i ∈ I, then x
△
≡
s
y, contradicting the
28
assumption that x ⊳
s
y. Thus x ⊳ σ(y)
△
≡ y. (Here “
△
≡ ” is by (Anon) and “ ⊳ ” is by
(SPar); both x and y are regular because I is finite.) Thus, x ⊳y by transitivity.
2
Proof of Proposition 3.4. Let x,y, z ∈ X I .
Transitive. Suppose xD
am
y and yD
am
z. Then there exist functions ω, γ : I−→I such that,
for all i ∈ I, we have xi yω(i) and yi zγ(i). Thus, xi zγ(ω(i)) for all i ∈ I; hence
xD
am
z.
(Par1) Suppose yixi for all i ∈ I. Let ω : I−→I be the identity map. Then yixω(i)
for all i ∈ I; hence yD
am
x.
(Par2) Suppose xi ≺ yi for all i ∈ I. From (Par1) we know that xE
am
y. To show that
x ⊳
am
y, we must show that x 6D
am
y. By contradiction, suppose xD
am
y; then there is
some ω : I−→I such that xi  yω(i) for all i ∈ I.
First suppose x is regular. Find j ∈ I such that, xi 6≺ xj for all other i ∈ I. But
xj  yω(j) ≻ xω(j), so xj ≻xω(j); contradiction.
Now suppose y is regular. Find j ∈ I such that, yi 6≺ yj for all other i ∈ I. But
yj ≻xj  yω(j), so yj ≻ yω(j); contradiction.
(Anon) Same as proof of (Anon) in Proposition 3.3(a).
(Hammond equity promoting) Let β : I0−→I0 and α : I↓−→I↑ be as in eqn.(2). Define
ω : I−→I as follows: For all i ∈ I0, let ω(i) := β(i). For all i ∈ I↓, let ω(i) := α(i).
For all i ∈ I↑, let ω(i) = i. Then clearly, for all i ∈ I, we have xω(i)  yi; hence
xE
am
y, as desired. 2
For any J ⊆ I and x ∈ X J , define J 0(x) := {j ∈ J ; xk 6≺ xj for all k ∈ J }.
Recall the extension of (D
am
) to a preorder on X I∗ defined in §3.3. Lemma 3.5 is a
special case of the next result.
Lemma B.1 Let J ,K ⊆ I, and let x ∈ X J and y ∈ XK If x
△
≡
am
y, then for every
j ∈ J 0(x), there exists some k ∈ K such that xj≈yk.
Proof. If x
△
≡
am
y, then we have both xD
am
y and yD
am
x. Thus, there exist functions
ω : J−→K and γ : K−→J such that, xj  yω(j) for all j ∈ J , while yk  xγ(k)
for all k ∈ K. Let j ∈ J 0(x). We have xj  yω(j)  xγ(ω(j)). If xj ≻ yω(j), then
we would have xj ≻ xγ(ω(j)), contradicting the fact that j ∈ J
0(x). Thus, we must
have xj≈yω(j). 2
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Proof of Proposition 3.6. (a) Well-defined. The 4-step definition of (D
alx
) uses a
maximal indifference matching between x and y. However, there may be more than
one maximal indifference matching. The question is: can one maximal indifference
matching yield x ⊳
alx
y in Step 4, while another one yields xD
alx
y? The next claim
implies this cannot happen.
Claim 1: Let (Kx,Ky, β) and (K
′
x
,K′
y
, β′) be two maximal indifference matchings
of x and y. Let Jx := I \ Kx, Jy := I \ Ky, J
′
x
:= I \ K′
x
and J ′
y
:= I \ K′
y
.
If x∗ := (xj)j∈Jx and x
′
∗ := (xj)j∈J ′x , then x∗
△
≡
am
x′∗.
If y∗ := (yj)j∈Jy and y
′
∗ := (yj)j∈J ′y , then y∗
△
≡
am
y′∗
Proof. For all z ∈ X , define
Iz
x∗
:=
{
j ∈ Jx ; xj≈z
}
, Iz
x′∗
:=
{
j ∈ J ′
x
; xj≈z
}
;
Iz
y∗
:=
{
j ∈ Jy ; yj≈z
}
, and Iz
y′∗
:=
{
j ∈ J ′
y
; yj≈z
}
.
Claim 1.1: For every z ∈ X , we have |Iz
x∗
| = |Iz
x′∗
| and |Iz
y∗
| = |Iz
y′∗
|.
Proof. Let Iz
x
:= {i ∈ I; xi≈z}; and I
z
y
:= {i ∈ I; yi≈z}. Then
Iz
x∗
= Iz
x
∩ Jx = I
z
x
\ Kx, I
z
x′∗
= Iz
x
∩ J ′
x
= Iz
x
\ K′
x
,
Iz
y∗
= Iz
y
∩ Jy = I
z
y
\ Ky, and I
z
y′∗
= Iz
y
∩ J ′
y
= Iz
y
\ K′
y
.
Recall that Kx,K
′
x
⊆ Ix, where Ix := {i ∈ I; ∃ j ∈ I with xi≈yj}. Likewise,
Ky,K
′
y
⊆ Iy, where Iy := {i ∈ I; ∃ j ∈ I with yi≈xj}. Now, either I
z
x
⊆ Ix
or Iz
x
is disjoint from Ix. Likewise, either I
z
y
⊆ Iy or I
z
y
is disjoint from Iy.
Furthermore, Iz
x
⊆ Ix if and only if I
z
y
⊆ Iy, and in this case, xi≈yj for all
i ∈ Iz
x
and all j ∈ Iz
y
. Thus, any indifference matching must then map Iz
x
into
Iz
y
. There are now four cases:
• Suppose Iz
x
is disjoint from Ix (hence, I
z
y
is disjoint from Iy). Then I
z
x∗
=
Iz
x
= Iz
x′∗
and Iz
y∗
= Iz
y
= Iz
y′∗
.
In the other three cases, Iz
x
⊆ Ix and I
z
y
⊆ Iy.
• Suppose |Iz
x
| = |Iz
y
|. Then any maximal indifference matching determines a
bijection from Iz
x
into Iz
y
; thus, we have Iz
x
⊆ Kx ∩ K
′
x
and Iz
y
⊆ Ky ∩ K
′
y
.
Thus, Iz
x∗
= ∅ = Iz
x′∗
and Iz
y∗
= ∅ = Iz
y′∗
.
• Suppose |Iz
x
| < |Iz
y
|. Then Iz
x
⊆ Kx ∩ K
′
x
, while |Jy ∩ I
z
y
| = |Iz
y
| − |Iz
x
| =
|J ′
y
∩ Iz
y
|.17 Thus, Iz
x∗
= ∅ = Iz
x′∗
and |Iz
y∗
| = |Iz
y′∗
|.
• Finally, suppose |Iz
x
| > |Iz
y
|. Then Iz
y
⊆ Ky∩K
′
y
, while |Jx∩I
z
x
| = |Iz
x
|−|Iz
y
| =
|J ′
x
∩ Iz
x
|. Thus, Iz
y∗
= ∅ = Iz
y′∗
and |Iz
x∗
| = |Iz
x′∗
|. ▽ Claim 1.1
17Recall: if |Iz
y
| > |Iz
x
| and |Iz
y
| is infinite, then |Iz
y
| − |Iz
x
| := |Iz
y
|.
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Claim 1.2: There exist bijections ξ : Jx−→J
′
x
and γ : Jx−→J
′
x
such that
xξ(j)≈xj for all j ∈ Jx, and yγ(j)≈yj for all j ∈ Jy.
Proof. The collection {Iz
x∗
; z ∈ X} forms a partition of Jx, while {I
z
x′∗
; z ∈ X}
forms a partition of J ′
x
. So, define ξ : Jx−→J
′
x
as follows: for each z ∈ X ,
if Iz
x∗
6= ∅, then let ξz : I
z
x∗
−→Iz
x′∗
be a bijection (which exists by Claim 1.1).
Then define ξ :=
⊔
z∈Z
ξz.
Likewise, {Iz
y∗
; z ∈ X} forms a partition of Jy, while {I
z
y′∗
; z ∈ X} forms a
partition of J ′
y
. So, define γ : Jy−→J
′
y
as follows: for each z ∈ X , if Iz
y∗
6= ∅,
then let γz : I
z
y∗
−→Iz
y′∗
be a bijection (which exists by Claim 1.1). Then define
γ :=
⊔
z∈Z
γz. ▽ Claim 1.2
Using the bijection ξ from Claim 1.2, we can establish both that x∗D
am
x′∗ and
x∗E
am
x′∗; thus, x∗
△
≡
am
x′∗. Likewise, the bijection γ yields y∗
△
≡
am
y′∗. 3 Claim 1
A second issue is whether every possible case is handled by one of Steps 1-4. If
x
△
≡
am
y, then Steps 3 and 4(a,b) always end with x
△
≡
alx
y. Otherwise, we proceed to
Step 4(c). Let x∗ := (xj)j∈Jx and y∗ := (yj)j∈Jy .
Claim 2: Either x∗ ⊳
am
y∗, or x∗ ⊲
am
y∗.
Proof. We have skipped Step 4(a), so either x∗E
am
y∗, or x∗D
am
y∗. We must show
x∗ 6
△
≡
am
y∗.
We have also skipped Step 4(b), so either x∗ or y∗ must be regular. If x∗ is
regular, then J 0
x
(x∗) is nonempty. Thus, if x∗
△
≡
am
y∗, then Lemma B.1 says that,
for every j ∈ J 0
x
(x∗), there is some i ∈ Jy such that xj≈yi. But for all i, j ∈ J ,
we have xj 6≈ yi by construction —contradiction. Thus, x∗ 6
△
≡
am
y∗.
Likewise, if y∗ is regular, then x∗ 6
△
≡
am
y∗. 3 Claim 2
Thus, if we have passed through Steps 4(a,b), then one of the two cases in Step 4(c)
always applies.
(Anon) Suppose there is some σ : I−→I such that y = σ(x). Then (I, I, σ) is a maximal
indifference matching, and Step 3 says x
△
≡
alx
y.
Refines. If x ⊳
am
y, then Step 2 in the definition of (D
alx
) yields x ⊳
alx
y. If x
△
≡
am
y, then Steps
3 and 4 always end with x
△
≡
alx
y, x ⊳
alx
y, or x ⊲
alx
y. Thus, (D
alx
) refines (D
am
).
(SPar) Let x,y ∈ X I , and suppose one of them is strongly regular, and xi  yi for all
i ∈ I, with xi ≺ yi for some i ∈ I. Axiom (Par) implies that xE
am
y, so we skip Step
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1. If x ⊳
am
y, then Step 2 says x ⊳
alx
y, as desired. Otherwise, we proceed to Step 3. We
can write I = J ⊔K, where xj ≺ yj for all j ∈ J and xk≈yk for all k ∈ K. Clearly,
(K,K, IdK) is a maximal indifference matching, so let x∗ := xJ and y∗ := yJ . One
of these two elements of X J is regular (because one of x or y was strongly regular).
Furthermore, xj ≺ yj for all j ∈ J , so x∗ ⊳
am
y∗ (because the preorder (D
am
) satisfies
axiom (Par2) on X J .) Thus, Step 4(c) says x ⊳
alx
y, as desired.
(Par2) If xi≺ yi for all i ∈ I, and one of x or y is regular, then x ⊳
am
y because (D
am
)
satisfies (Par2). Thus, Step 2 says x ⊳
alx
y.
(Par1) Suppose xiyi for all i ∈ I; we must show xE
alx
y. If xi≈yi for all i ∈ I, then
(I, I, IdI) is a maximal indifference matching, so Step 3 says that x
△
≡
alx
y. Other-
wise, xi≺ yi for some i ∈ I, so xE
am
y. If x ⊳
am
y, then Step 2 says xE
alx
y. Otherwise,
we fall through to Step 4. If neither xJ nor yJ is regular, then Step 4(b) yields
x
△
≡
alx
y. Otherwise, if one of them is regular, then we must have x∗ ⊳
am
y∗ and hence
x ⊳
alx
y, just as in the proof of axiom (SPar) above.
Same Scope. If x ⊲6 ⊳
am
y, then Step 1 says that x ⊲6 ⊳
alx
y. On the other hand, invocation of
Step 1 is the only way to get x ⊲6 ⊳
alx
y. Thus, x ⊲6 ⊳
alx
y if and only if x ⊲6 ⊳
am
y
Extends. Since (D
alx
) refines (D
am
) and they have the same scope, this follows from Lemma
A.1(d).
(b) If ( ) is also a complete preorder on X , then Steps 1 and 4(a) are never triggered.
If I is finite, then x∗ and y∗ are always regular, so Step 4(b) is also never triggered.
Thus, the ordering is always decided by Steps 2, 3 or 4(c). It is easy to check that
this always agrees with the outcome of the leximin order on X I . 2
Proof of Example 5.2. For any b,p ∈ B, we have b◭
æ,ψ
p iff either (1) b1 ≤ p1 and
b2 ≤ p2, or (2) b1 ≤ p1 and b1 < p2 − δ or (3) b2 ≤ p2 and b2 < p1 − δ. Case (1) is
impossible if and only if b ∈ P. So, suppose b ∈ P. If p ∈ P \ {b}, then (NFL)
yields (bk ≤ pk) ⇔ (bk < pk) for k = 1, 2. Thus, conditions (2) and (3) become:
(2′) b1 < p1 and b1 < p2 − δ; and (3
′) b2 < p2 and b2 < p1 − δ. For k = 1, 2, let
P k := max {pk ; (p1, p2) ∈ P}. Then(
b ∈ wkUnd
(
B, ◮
æ,ψ
))
⇐⇒
(
∀ p ∈ P \ {b}, Case (2′) is false and Case (3′) is false
)
⇐⇒
(
∀ p ∈ P, [b1 ≥ p1 or b1 + δ ≥ p2] and [b2 ≥ p2 or b2 + δ ≥ p1]
)
⇐⇒
(
∀ p ∈ P, [(b1 < p1)⇒ (b1 + δ ≥ p2)] and [(b2 < p2)⇒ (b2 + δ ≥ p1)]
)
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x2
y1
y2
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x
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3
x
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1
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/
2
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/
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/
3
x’ y’
Figure 4: The proof of Proposition 6.1. Arrows point from ‘better’ to ‘worse’ alter-
natives. Double-headed arrows indicate indifference. Incomparable elements are not
linked.
⇐
(∗)
⇒
(
∀ p ∈ P, [(b2 > p2)⇒ (b1 + δ ≥ p2)] and [(b1 > p1)⇒ (b2 + δ ≥ p1)]
)
⇐⇒
(
∀ p2 ≤ P 2, [(b2 > p2)⇒ (b1 + δ ≥ p2)], while
∀ p1 ≤ P 1, [(b1 > p1)⇒ (b2 + δ ≥ p1)]
)
⇐⇒
(
b1 + δ ≥ b2 and b2 + δ ≥ b1
)
⇐⇒
(
|b1 − b2| ≤ δ
)
.
Here, (∗) is because (NFL) says (b1 < p1)⇔ (b2 > p2) for all b,p ∈ P. 2
Proof of Proposition 6.1. (by contradiction) For simplicity, suppose I = {1, 2, 3} (a
similar argument works for |I| ≥ 4). Suppose there exists a separable ( )-social
preorder (D ) which refines (D
am
).
Consider two points x,y ∈ X I such that y1≈x1  x2 and y2 ≺ y3≈x3, but
x1≻6≺ y2≻6≺x2, as shown in Figure 4(a). (For example, if a, b, b
′, c′ ∈ X are as in the
hypothesis of the theorem, then we could set y1 = x1 = a, x2 = b, y2 = b
′, and
y3 = x3 = c
′). Then xD
am
y (define ω(1) := ω(2) := 1 and ω(3) := 2), but x 6E
am
y
(because y2≻6≺ x1, y2≻6≺ x2, and y2 ≺ x3). Thus, x ⊳
am
y, so we must also have x ⊳y,
because (D ) refines (D
am
).
Next, define x′,y′ ∈ X I such that x′1≈y
′
1  y
′
2 = y2 and x2 = x
′
2 ≺ x
′
3≈y
′
3, but
y′1≻6≺ x
′
2≻6≺ y
′
2, as shown in Figure 4(b). (For example, set y
′
1 = x
′
1 = a
′, x2 = b,
y2 = b
′, and y3 = x3 = c). Then by an argument similar to the previous paragraph,
we have x′ ⊲y′,
Let J := {2}. Then xJ = x
′
J and yJ = y
′
J (because x2 = x
′
2 and y2 = y
′
2), and
for all i ∈ I \ J = {1, 3}, we have xi≈yi and x
′
i≈y
′
i. Thus, as x
′ ⊲y′, axiom (Sep)
implies that x ⊲y. Contradiction. 2
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Proof of Proposition 6.3. Clearly, (IdX )
I = IdXI . Also, if α : X1−→X2 and β :
X2−→X3, then (β ◦ α)
I = βI ◦ αI . Thus, F is a functor if and only if the following
condition is satisfied:
(CF) For all (X1, 
1
) and (X2, 
2
) in P, if α is a morphism from (X1, 
1
) into
(X2, 
2
), then αI is a morphism from (X I1 , D1 ) into (X
I
2 , D2 ).
Thus it suffices to prove that (MPIIA) ⇐⇒ (CF).
“=⇒” Let x1,y1 ∈ X I1 , and let x
2 := αI(x1) and y2 := αI(y1). Then statement (5)
holds, because α is a morphism. Thus, (MPIIA) says (x1D
1
y1) ⇐⇒ (x2D
2
y2).
Since this holds for any x1,y1 ∈ X I1 , we conclude that α
I is a morphism.
This argument works for any (X1, 
1
) and (X2, 
2
) in P, and any morphism α
from (X1, 
1
) to (X2, 
2
); this verifies (CF).
“⇐=” (by contrapositive) Suppose (MPIIA) is violated. Thus, there exist some (X1, 
1
)
and (X2, 
2
) in P and some x1,y1 ∈ X I1 and x
2,y2 ∈ X I2 such that statement (5)
holds, and x1D
1
y1, but x2 6D
2
y2.
Let Y1 := {x
1
i }i∈I ∪ {y
1
i }i∈I , and Y2 := {x
2
i }i∈I ∪ {y
2
i }i∈I . Assume all these
elements are distinct (we can ensure this by introducing multiple ‘clones’ of each
element into X1 and X2, if necessary). Restrict (
k
) to a preorder on Yk for k =
1, 2. Define α : Y1−→Y2 by α(x
1
i ) := x
2
i and α(y
1
i ) := y
2
i , for all i ∈ I. Then
α is a morphism from (Y1, 
1
) to (Y2, 
2
), by hypothesis (5). By construction,
αI(x1) = x2 and αI(y1) = y2. Thus, αI is not a morphism from (YI1 , D1 ) to
(YI2 , D2 ), because x
1D
1
y1, while x2 6D
2
y2. Thus, (CF) is false. 2
We will often use the following fact (whose proof is obvious).
Fact B.2. If u ∈ U( ), and f : R−→R is strictly increasing, then f ◦ u ∈ U( )
also.
Proof of Proposition 7.2. “⇐=” (D
u
) satisfies (Anon) because (◮ ) satisfies (Anon◮).
If u ∈ U( ), then (D
u
) satisfies (Par1) and (Par2) because (◮ ) satisfies (Par1◮)
and (Par2◮). (Regularity is automatic, because I is finite.)
“=⇒” (by contradiction) Suppose u 6∈ U( ). Then either statement (6) or statement
(7) is violated. If (6) is violated, then there exist y, z ∈ X such that y  z, but
u(y) > u(z). Let x1 and x2 be the ‘clone worlds’ such that x1i = y for all i ∈ I,
while x2i = z for all i ∈ I. Then u(x
1
i ) > u(x
2
i ) for all i ∈ I, and I is finite,
so u(x1)◮u(x2) by (Par2◮); hence x1 ⊲
u
x2. But x1i  x
2
i for all i ∈ I, so (Par1)
requires that x1E
u
x2. Contradiction.
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If statement (7) is violated, then there exist y, z ∈ X such that y ≺ z, but
u(y) ≥ u(z). Let x1 and x2 be the same ‘clone worlds’ as the previous paragraph.
Then u(x1)◮u(x2) by (Par1◮), so x1D
u
x2. But I is finite, so (Par2) requires that
x1 ⊳
u
x2. Again we have a contradiction. 2
Proof of Proposition 7.4. “⇐=” We must verify (NEHIC). Direction “⇐=” in
(NEHIC) follows immediately from axiom (Par1). We will verify direction “=⇒” by
showing the contrapositive. Suppose x 6 y. Then the multiutility representation (8)
implies that there exists v ∈ V such that v(x) > v(y). Thus, v(xI) = v(x)I is strictly
Pareto superior to v(yI) = v(y)I , and both v(x)I and v(y)I are clearly regular, so
(Par2◮) says that v(xI)◮v(yI). Thus, definition (9) implies that xI 6E
V
yI .
“=⇒” (by contrapositive) Suppose V does not provide a multiutility representation (8)
for ( ). Then there exist x, y ∈ X such that v(x) ≤ v(y) for all v ∈ V, but x 6 y.
Thus, for all v ∈ V, the vector v(xI) is Pareto inferior to v(yI), so (Par1◮) says
that v(xI)◭v(yI); thus definition (9) implies that xI E
V
yI , contradicting (NEHIC).
2
Lemma B.3 Suppose U( ) 6= ∅. Let Y ⊆ X and let z ∈ X .
(a) If y 6 z for all y ∈ Y, then there exists u ∈ U( ) such that u(y) > u(z) for
all y ∈ Y.
(b) If y 6≺ z for all y ∈ Y, then there exists u ∈ U( ) such that u(y) ≥ u(z)
for all y ∈ Y.
Proof. Let u0 ∈ U( ) be arbitrary. Let f : R−→(0,∞) be a strictly increasing
bijection (e.g. f(x) = exp(x)), and let u1 := f ◦ u0. Then Fact B.2 says u1 ∈ U( )
also. Let r := u1(z); then r > 0. Let X1 := {x ∈ X ; xz} and let X2 := X \ X1.
Define u : X−→R as follows:
• u(x) := u1(x)− r − 1, for all x ∈ X1.
• u(x) := u1(x), for all x ∈ X2.
Claim 1: u ∈ U( ).
Proof. We must check statements (6) and (7). Let x, x′ ∈ X . Suppose xx′; we
must show that u(x) ≤ u(x′). If x′ ∈ X1, then x ∈ X1 also (by transitivity).
Thus, there are only three cases: either x, x′ ∈ X1, or x, x
′ ∈ X2, or x ∈ X1 and
x′ ∈ X2.
• If x, x′ ∈ X2, then u(x) = u1(x)≤
(∗)
u1(x
′) = u(x′).
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• If x, x′ ∈ X1, then u(x) = u1(x)− r − 1≤
(∗)
u1(x
′)− r − 1 = u(x′).
• If x ∈ X1 and x
′ ∈ X2, then u(x) = u1(x)− r − 1 < u1(x)≤
(∗)
u1(x
′) = u(x′).
In all three cases, (∗) is because u1 ∈ U( ), and the equalities are all by definition
of u. This verifies statement (6).
Now suppose x≺ x′. Then in all three cases above, “≤
(∗)
” changes to “<”. Thus,
u(x) < u(x′); this verifies statement (7). 3 Claim 1
Claim 2: Let y ∈ X . If u(y) ≤ u(z), then yz.
Proof. By construction of u, we have u(z) = −1, whereas for all x ∈ X2, we have
u(x) = u1(x) > 0 > −1. Thus, if u(y) ≤ u(z) = −1, then y 6∈ X2; hence y ∈ X1,
which means yz. 3 Claim 2
(a) We must show that u(y) > u(z) for all y ∈ Y . By contradiction, suppose u(y) ≤
u(z) for some y ∈ Y . Then Claim 2 implies that yz; this contradicts the hypothesis
of part (a).
(b) We must show that u(y) ≥ u(z) for all y ∈ Y . By contradiction, suppose u(y) <
u(z) for some y ∈ Y . Again, Claim 2 implies that yz. Now, if y≈z, then statement
(6) would imply that u(y) = u(z). But u(y) < u(z), so we must have y≺ z. This
contradicts the hypothesis of part (b). 2
Proof of Proposition 7.5. (Anon) For any x ∈ X I and any permutation σ : I−→I,
we have u(σ(x)) = σ[u(x)] for every u ∈ U( ). Thus, u(x)
N
≡u[σ(x)] for every
u ∈ U( ) by (Anon◮); thus, definition (10) implies that x
△
≡ σ(x).
(Par1) Let x,y ∈ X I and suppose xiyi for all i ∈ I. Then for any u ∈ U( ), statement
(6) implies that u(xi) ≤ u(yi) for all i ∈ I; hence u(x)◭u(y) by (Par1
◮). Thus
definition (10) implies that xEy.
(Par2) Now suppose xi≺ yi for all i ∈ I, and one of x or y is regular. Axiom (Par1)
implies that xEy; to show that x ⊳y, we must show that x 6D y.
Suppose x is regular —i.e. there exists j ∈ I such that xi 6≺ xj for all i ∈ I \{j}.
Setting z := xj and Y := {xi; i ∈ I \ {j}} in Lemma B.3(b), we obtain u ∈ U( )
such that u(xi) ≥ u(xj) for all i ∈ I \{j}. Let r := u(x). Then r is regular, because
min
i∈I
(ri) = rj. Also, for every i ∈ I, statement (7) implies u(xi) < u(yi), because
xi≺ yi. Thus, axiom (Par2
◮) says u(x)◭u(y). Thus, it is false that u(x)◮u(y)
for all u ∈ U( ); hence definition (10) says that x 6D y. Thus, x ⊳y, as desired.
The case when y is regular is similar. 2
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Proof of Proposition 7.7. (a) Let (D
mm
) denote the ( , ◮
m
)-metric social preorder.
Let x,y ∈ X I . We must show
(
yD
am
x
)
⇐⇒
(
yD
mm
x
)
.
“=⇒” Suppose yD
am
x. Let ω : I−→I be such that yixω(i) for all i ∈ I. Then for any
u ∈ U( ), statement (6) says u(yi) ≥ u(xω(i)) for all i ∈ I. Thus, the function ω
also demonstrates that u(y)◮
m
u(x). This holds for all u ∈ U( ); hence yD
mm
x.
“⇐=” (by contrapositive) Suppose x E
am
/ y. Then there is some j ∈ I such that, for
every i ∈ I, xi 6 yj. Setting z := yj and Y := {xi; i ∈ I} in Lemma B.3(a), we
obtain u ∈ U( ) such that u(xi) > u(yj) for all i ∈ I. Thus, there is no function
ω : I−→I such that u(x)ω(j) ≤ u(y)j; hence u(x) 6◭
m
u(y). Thus statement (10) is
not satisfied, so x 6E
mm
y.
(b) Let x,y ∈ X I . Let (Kx,Ky, β) be a maximal indifference matching of x and y.
Thus, xk≈yβ(k), for all k ∈ Kx; thus, for all u ∈ U( ), statement (6) implies that
u(xk) = u(yβ(k)), for all k ∈ Kx. (13)
Let Jx := I \ Kx, Jy := I \ Ky, x∗ := (xj)j∈Jx , and y∗ := (yj)j∈Jy . Then
xi 6≈ yj, ∀ i ∈ Jx and j ∈ Jy (14)
(because otherwise (Kx,Ky, β) would not be maximal). Let J := |I| − |Kx| =
|I| − |Ky|; then |Jx| = J = |Jy|, because I is finite. Thus, we can regard both x∗
and y∗ as elements of X
J . Likewise, we can identify both RJx and RJy with RJ ,
and then compare elements of RJx and RJy using (◮
lex
) or (◮
m
).
Claim 3: (i) If x ⊲6 ⊳
alx
y, then x ⊲6 ⊳
mlx
y.
(ii) If x ⊲
alx
y, then either x ⊲
mlx
y or x ⊲6 ⊳
mlx
y.
(iii) If x
△
≡
alx
y, then either x
△
≡
mlx
y or x ⊲6 ⊳
mlx
y.
Proof. (i) Step 1 in the definition of (D
alx
) implies that x ⊲6 ⊳
alx
y if and only if x ⊲6 ⊳
am
y.
But then x ⊲6 ⊳
mm
y by part (a). Thus, there exist u, v ∈ U( ) such that u(x)◭
m
u(y)
while v(x)◮
m
v(y). But then u(x)◭
lex
u(y) and v(x)◮
lex
v(y). Thus, x ⊲6 ⊳
mlx
y.
(ii) If x ⊲
alx
y, then either Step 2 or Step 4(c) was invoked.
First suppose x ⊲
alx
y by Step 2; then we have x ⊲
am
y. Thus, part (a) implies
x ⊲
mm
y. Thus, for every u ∈ U( ), either u(x)
N
≡
m
u(y) or u(x)◮
m
u(y), with the
latter occurring for at least one v ∈ U( ). Thus, we have v(x)◮
lex
v(y) for at least
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one v ∈ U( ). If u(x)◮
lex
u(y) for all other u ∈ U( ), then x ⊲
mlx
y; otherwise, if
u(x)◭
lex
u(y) for some u ∈ U( ), then x ⊲6 ⊳
mlx
y
Now suppose x ⊲
alx
y by Step 4(c); then x∗ ⊲
am
y∗. Thus, there exists ω : Jx−→Jy
such that xj  yω(j) for all j ∈ Jx. But (14) says xj 6≈ yω(j), so we must have
xj ≻ yω(j) for all j ∈ Jx. Thus, for all u ∈ U( ), statement (7) says that
u(xj) > u(yω(j)) for all j ∈ Jx. (15)
Combining statements (13) and (15), we get u(x)◮
lex
u(y). This holds for all
u ∈ U( ); thus, x ⊲
mlx
y.
(iii) If x
△
≡
alx
y, then either Step 3 or Step 4(a) was invoked. (Step 4(b) cannot happen
because x∗ and y∗ are both regular because Jx,Jy ⊆ I and I is finite).
First suppose x
△
≡
alx
y by Step 3. Then Kx = Ky = I, so β : I−→I is a
bijection. Thus, for any u ∈ U( ), statement (13) says that β[u(x)] = u(y), and
hence u(x)
N
≡
lex
u(y) by (Anon◮). Thus, x
△
≡
mlx
y.
Now suppose x
△
≡
alx
y by Step 4(a). Then x∗ ⊲6 ⊳
am
y∗. But then x∗ ⊲6 ⊳
mm
y∗ by part
(a). Thus, there exist u, v ∈ U( ) such that
u(x∗) ◭
m
u(y∗) while v(x∗) ◮
m
v(y∗). (16)
Combining (13) and (16), we get u(x)◭
lex
u(y) and v(x)◮
lex
v(y). Thus, x ⊲6 ⊳
mlx
y.
3 Claim 3
Taking the contrapositives of the implications in Claim 1, we have:(
x ⊲
mlx
y
)
=⇒
(
x ⊲
alx
y
)
, and
(
x
△
≡
mlx
y
)
=⇒
(
x
△
≡
alx
y
)
.
Thus, (D
alx
) extends and refines (D
mlx
). 2
For the proof of Theorem 7.10, we require some preliminary results. For any
r1, r2, r3 ∈ RI , the rank structure of the triple (r1, r2, r3) is the complete preorder (⋖)
on {1, 2, 3} × I defined as follows: for all n,m ∈ {1, 2, 3} and i, j ∈ I, (n, i)⋖(m, j) if
and only if rni ≤ r
m
j .
For any f : R−→R and r ∈ RI , define f(r) := r′ ∈ RI , where r′i := f(ri) for all
i ∈ I. Recall the axiom of Ordinal Level Comparability for a SWO:
(OLC) For any increasing f : R−→R and r1, r2 ∈ RI :
(
r1◭ r2
)
⇐⇒
(
f(r1) ◭ f(r2)
)
.
Lemma B.4 Let ( ) be an interpersonal preorder on X which satisfies axiom (MR)
and has U( ) 6= ∅.
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(a) For any r1, r2, r3 ∈ RI, there exist fully comparable x1,x2,x3 ∈ X I and
u ∈ U( ) such that u(xj) = rj for j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, and the rank structure of
(r1, r2, r3) is the same as the rank structure of (x1,x2,x3).
(b) Let (◮ ) be a SWO on RI. Let (D ) be the (◮ ,  )-metric preorder (10).
Then (
(D ) is minimally decisive
)
⇐⇒
(
(◮ ) satisfies (OLC)
)
.
Proof.
Claim 1: Let r1, r2, r3, s1, s2, s3 ∈ RI . If (r1, r2, r3) has the same rank structure
as (s1, s2, s3), then there exists some increasing function f : R−→R with sn = f(rn)
for all n ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
Proof. Let R := {rni ; i ∈ I, n ∈ {1, 2, 3}} and S := {s
n
i ; i ∈ I, n ∈ {1, 2, 3}}.
Define f : R−→S by f(rni ) := s
n
i . If (r
1, r2, r3) has the same rank structure as
(s1, s2, s3), then f is well-defined and order-preserving. Thus, we can extend f to
an increasing function f : R−→R, with sn = f(rn) for all n ∈ {1, 2, 3}. 3 Claim 1
Claim 2: Let x1,x2,x3 ∈ X I be fully ()-comparable. If u ∈ U( ), rn := u(xn)
for all n ∈ {1, 2, 3}, then the rank structure of (r1, r2, r3) is the same as the rank
structure of (x1,x2,x3).
Proof. This follows immediately from statements (6) and (7). 3 Claim 2
(a) Axiom (MR) says that we can find some fully ()-comparable x1,x2,x3 ∈ X I such
that the rank structure of (x1,x2,x3) is the same as the rank structure of (r1, r2, r3).
Let u′ ∈ U( ), let sn := u′(xn) for all n ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Then Claim 2 says the rank
structure of (s1, s2, s3) is the same as that of of (x1,x2,x3), and thus, the same as
that of (r1, r2, r3). Thus, Claim 1 says there is an increasing function f : R−→R,
with rn = f(sn) for all n ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Let u := f ◦ u′; then u ∈ U( ) by Fact
B.2, and rn := u(xn) for all n ∈ {1, 2, 3}, as desired. The statement about rank
structure follows from Claim 2.
(b) “=⇒” (by contrapositive) Suppose (◮ ) violates (OLC). Then there exists some
r1, r2 ∈ RI and increasing g : R−→R such that r1◭r2 but g(r1)◮g(r2).
Part (a) yields some fully ()-comparable x1,x2 ∈ X I and u ∈ U( ) such
that u(x1) = r
1 and u(x2) = r
2. Now, let u′′ := g ◦ u; then u′′ ∈ U( ) by
Fact B.2, u′′(x1) = g(r
1) and u′′(x2) = g(r
2). But r1◭r2, while g(r1)◮g(r2).
Thus, statement (10) implies that neither x1Ex2 nor x2Ex1. Thus, x1 is not (D )-
comparable to x2; hence (D ) is not minimally decisive.
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(b) “⇐=” Suppose (◮ ) satisfies (OLC).
Claim 3: Let r1, r2, s1, s2 ∈ RI . If (r1, r2) has the same rank structure as (s1, s2),
and r1◭r2, then s1◭s2.
Proof. Claim 1 says there is an increasing function f : R−→R, with s1 = f(r1) and
s2 = f(r2). Thus, if r1◭r2, then s1◭s2, because (◮ ) satisfies (OLC). 3 Claim 3
Let x1,x2 ∈ X I be fully ()-comparable and let u ∈ U( ). Let r1 := u(x1) and
r2 := u(x2). Since (◮ ) is a complete ordering of RI , we have either r1◭r2 or r2◭r1.
Without loss of generality, assume r1◭r2.
Claim 4: For all u′ ∈ U( ), we have u′(x1)◭u′(x2).
Proof. Let s1 := u′(x1), and s2 := u′(x2). Claim 2 says the rank structure of (s1, s2)
is the same as that of (x1,x2), which is in turn the same as that of (r1, r2). Thus,
if r1◭r2, then Claim 3 implies that s1◭s2. 3 Claim 4
Combining Claim 4 with statement (10), we see that x1Ex2. Thus, x1 is (D )-
comparable to x2. This argument works for any x1,x2 ∈ X I which are fully ()-
comparable. Thus, (D ) is minimally decisive. 2
Consider the following version of the ‘minimal charity’ property for a SWO (◮ ).
(MinCh◮) There exist r, s ∈ RI and i ∈ I such that:
(ch1◮) ri < si ≤ sj < rj for all j ∈ I \ {i}; and (ch2
◮) r ◭ s.
Lemma B.5 Let (◮ ) be a SWO on RI and let (D ) be the (◮ ,  )-metric preorder
(10). If (D ) satisfies (MinCh), then (◮ ) satisfies (MinCh◮).
Proof. Find x,y ∈ X I satisfying conditions (ch1) and (ch2) in axiom (MinCh). Let
u ∈ U( ), let r := u(x), and let s := u(y). We claim that r and s satisfy conditions
(ch1◮) and (ch2◮).
(ch1◮): For all j ∈ I \ {i}, we have xi ≺ yi  yj ≺ xj, by (ch1); thus, statements (6)
and (7) imply that ri < si ≤ sj < rj.
(ch2◮): We have xEy by (ch2), so statement (10) requires that r◭s. 2
Lemma B.6 Let (◮
1
) and (◮
2
) be two SWOs on RI. Let (D
k
) be the ( , ◮
k
)-metric
preorder for k = 1, 2. If (◮
2
) extends (◮
1
), then (D
2
) extends (D
1
).
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Proof. Let x,y ∈ X I . Then(
xE
1
y
)
⇐
(10)
⇒
(
u(x)◭
1
u(y) for all u ∈ U( )
)
(∗)
=⇒
(
u(x)◭
2
u(y) for all u ∈ U( )
)
⇐
(10)
⇒
(
xE
2
y
)
,
where (∗) is because (◮
2
) extends (◮
1
). 2
(Note that the proof of Lemma B.6 breaks down if we replace ‘extends’ with ‘refines’.)
Finally, we restate the following well-known result for reference:
Lemma B.7 Let (◮ ) be a SWO on RI. If (◮ ) satisfies (OLC), then (◮ ) refines
the rank-k dictatorship SWO (◮
k
) for some k ∈ [1 . . . I].
Proof. See (Roberts, 1980, Thm.4), or (Moulin, 1988, Thm 2.4, page 40). 2
Proof of Theorem 7.10. (a) Define a relation (◮ ) on RI as follows: for any r, s ∈ RI ,
(
r◭s
)
⇐⇒
(
∃ u ∈ U() and xEy ∈ X I with u(x) = r and u(y) = s
)
. (17)
Claim 1: (◮ ) is a social welfare order on RI .
Proof. Complete. Let r, s ∈ RI . Lemma B.4(a) yields some fully ()-comparable
x,y ∈ X I and u ∈ U() such that u(x) = r and u(y) = s. Since (D ) is
minimally decisive, we have either xEy or xDy. Thus, definition (17) implies
that either r◭s or r◮ s.
Transitive. Let r1, r2, r3 ∈ RI . Suppose r1◭r2 and r2◭r3; we must show that r1◭r3.
Lemma B.4(a) yields some fully ()-comparable x1,x2,x3 ∈ X I and u ∈ U()
such that u(xk) = rk for k = 1, 2, 3.
Claim 1.1: x1Ex2 and x2Ex3
Proof. r1◭r2, so definition (17) yields some y1Ey2 ∈ X I and v ∈ U() such that
v(y1) = r1 and v(y2) = r2. But then (y1,y2) ∼= (x1,x2). Thus, axiom (C)
says x1 6⊲ x2. But (D ) is minimally decisive, so either x1Ex2 or x1 ⊲x2. We
conclude that x1Ex2. By identical reasoning, we have x2Ex3. ▽ Claim 1.1
Transitivity of (D ) thus implies that x1Ex3. Thus, definition (17) says r1◭r3.
41
(Par1◮) Let r, s ∈ RI . Suppose ri ≤ si for all i ∈ I. Lemma B.4(a) yields some fully
()-comparable x,y ∈ X I and u ∈ U() such that u(x) = r and u(y) = s, and
such that (x,y) has the same rank structure as (r, s). Thus, xi  yi for all i ∈ I.
Thus, axiom (Par1) implies that xEy. Thus, definition (17) implies that r◭s.
(Par2◮) Suppose ri < si for all i ∈ I. Then statement (6) implies xi 6 yi for all
i ∈ I; hence xi ≺ yi for all i ∈ I (by full comparability). Both x and y are
regular, because I is finite. Thus, axiom (Par2) implies that x ⊳y. Thus, for any
x′,y′ ∈ X I and any u′ ∈ U( ) with u′(x′) = r and u′(y′) = s, axiom (C) says
x′ 6D y′. Thus, definition (17) implies that r 6 ◮ s. Since (◮ ) is complete, we
must have r◭ s instead, as desired.
(Anon◮) Let r ∈ RI and let σ : I−→I be a permutation. Find some x ∈ X I and
u ∈ U() such that u(x) = r. Thus, u(σ(x)) = σ(r). Axiom (Anon) says
x
△
≡ σ(x). Thus, definition (17) implies that r
N
≡σ(r). 3 Claim 1
Let (D
∗
) be the (, ◮ )-metric preorder on X I , as in definition (10).
Claim 2: (D
∗
) extends (D ).
Proof. Let x,y ∈ X I and suppose xEy; we must show that xE
∗
y. Let u ∈ U().
If r = u(x) and s = u(y), then definition (17) implies that r◭s, because xEy.
Thus, u(x)◭u(y). This holds for all u ∈ U(), so xE
∗
y, as desired. 3 Claim 2
Now, (D
∗
) is minimally decisive because it extends the minimally decisive preorder
(D ). However Lemma B.4(b) says that (D
∗
) is minimally decisive if and only if (◮ )
satisfies (OLC). Thus, Lemma B.7 says that (◮ ) refines some rank-k dictatorship
SWO (◮
k
). Then Lemma A.1(d) says (◮
k
) extends (◮ ) (because they are both
complete, being SWOs). Then Lemma B.6 says (D
k
) extends (D ).
(b) From (a) we know that (D
k
) extends (D ); we must show that k = 1. If (D )
satisfies (MinCh), then its extension (D
k
) also satisfies (MinCh); then Lemma B.5
says that (◮
k
) satisfies (MinCh◮). But the only rank-k dictatorship which satisfies
(MinCh◮) is the maximin SWO (◮
1
). Thus, (◮
k
) is (◮
1
). Thus, (D
1
) extends (D ).
But Proposition 7.7(a) says that (D
1
) is (D
am
).
(c) “=⇒” If (D ) has the same scope as (D
am
), then (D ) is minimally decisive (because
(D
am
) is minimally decisive). Thus, if (D ) also satisfies (MinCh), then part (b) says
that (D
am
) extends (D ). But they have the same scope, so Lemma A.1(d) then says
that (D ) refines (D
am
).
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(c) “⇐=” and (d) . Suppose (D ) either extends or refines (D
am
); we will show that (D )
is minimally decisive and satisfies (MinCh).
Minimally Decisive. (D
am
) is minimally decisive by Example 7.8. Thus, if (D ) extends or
refines (D
am
), then (D ) is also minimally decisive (because (D ) can compare any
pair of worlds which (D
am
) can compare).
Minimal Charity. Using axiom (MR), find fully ()-comparable worlds x,y ∈ X I and
i ∈ I such that xi ≺ yi  yj ≺ xj for all j ∈ I. Thus, x,y satisfies condition (ch1).
Also, xE
am
y (define ω : I−→I by ω(j) := i for all j ∈ I). However, x 6D
am
y (because
xi ≺ yj for all j ∈ I). Thus, x ⊳
am
y. Thus, if (D ) either extends or refines (D
am
), then
xEy. Thus, x,y also satisfy condition (ch2) for (D ); hence (D ) satisfies (MinCh).
At this point, part (b) says that (D
am
) extends (D ). So, if (D ) also extends (D
am
),
then they must be equal; this proves (d). On the other hand, if (D ) refines (D
am
),
then they have the same scope; this establishes direction “⇐=” of (c). 2
References
Arrow, K. J., 1963. Individual Values and Social Choice, 2nd Edition. John Wiley & Sons, New York.
Arrow, K. J., 1977. Extended sympathy and the possibility of social choice. American Economic
Review: Papers and Proceedings 67, 219–225.
Arrow, K. J., Sen, A. K., Suzumura, K. (Eds.), 2002. Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare. Vol. I.
North-Holland, Amsterdam.
Barthe´le´my, J.-P., 1982. Arrow’s theorem: unusual domains and extended codomains. Math. Social
Sci. 3 (1), 79–89.
Basu, K., 1980. Revealed preference of government. Cambridge UP, Cambridge, UK.
Baucells, M., Shapley, L. S., 2006. Multiperson utility: the linearly independent case. (preprint)
http://webprofesores.iese.edu/mbaucells.
Baucells, M., Shapley, L. S., 2008. Multiperson utility. Games Econom. Behav. 62 (2), 329–347.
Blackorby, C., 1975. Degrees of cardinality and aggregate partial orderings. Econometrica 43 (5–6),
845–852.
d’Aspremont, C., Gevers, L., 2002. Social welfare functionals and interpersonal comparability. In:
Arrow et al. (2002), Vol. I, pp. 459–541.
Elster, J., Roemer, J. E. (Eds.), 1991. Interpersonal comparisons of well-being. Cambridge UP,
Cambridge, UK.
Fine, B., 1975. A note on “Interpersonal aggregation and partial comparability”. Econometrica 43,
169–172.
43
Fishburn, P. C., 1974. Impossibility theorems without the social completeness axiom. Econometrica
42, 695–704.
Fleurbaey, M., Hammond, P. J., 2004. Interpersonally comparable utility. In: Barbera´, S., Hammond,
P. J., Seidl, C. (Eds.), Handbook of Utility Theory. Vol. II. Kluwer, Boston, pp. 1179–1285.
Hammond, P., 1991. Interpersonal comparisons: why and how they are and should be made. In:
Elster and Roemer (1991), pp. 200–254.
Harsanyi, J., 1977. Rational behaviour and bargaining equilibrium in games and social situations.
Cambridge UP, Cambridge, UK.
Jeffrey, R. C., October 1971. On interpersonal utility theory. The Journal of Philosophy LXVIII (20),
647–656.
Levi, I., 1986. Hard choices: decision-making under unresolved conflict. Cambridge UP, Cambridge,
UK.
Mac Lane, S., 1998. Categories for the working mathematician, 2nd Edition. Vol. 5 of Graduate Texts
in Mathematics. Springer-Verlag, New York.
Mandler, M., 2006. Cardinality versus ordinality: A suggested compromise. The American Economic
Review 96 (4), 1114–1136.
Moulin, H., 1988. Axioms of cooperative decision making. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,
UK.
Pini, M. S., Rossi, F., Venable, K. B., Walsh, T., 2009. Aggregating Partially Ordered Preferences.
J Logic Computation 19 (3), 475–502.
Pivato, M., 2010a. Approximate interpersonal comparisons of well-being. (preprint)
http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/25224.
Pivato, M., 2010b. Risky social choice with approximate interpersonal comparisons of well-being.
(preprint) http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/25222.
Pivato, M., 2010c. Quasi-utilitarian social evaluation with approximate interpersonal comparison of
welfare gains. (preprint).
Roberts, K. W., 1980. Possibility theorems with interpersonally comparable welfare levels. Review of
Economic Studies 47, 409–420.
Saposnik, R., 1983. On evaluating income distributions: Rank dominance, the Suppes-Sen grading
principle of justice, and Pareto optimality. Public Choice 40 (3), 329–336.
Sen, A., 1970a. Interpersonal aggregation and partial comparability. Econometrica 38, 393–409.
Sen, A., 1972. Interpersonal comparison and partial comparability: A correction. Econometrica 40 (5),
959.
Sen, A. K., 1970b. Collective choice and social welfare. Holden Day, San Francisco.
Sen, A. K., 1985. Commodites and capabilities. North-Holland, Amsterdam.
Sen, A. K., 1988. The standard of living. Cambridge UP, Cambridge, UK.
Sen, A. K., 1997. Maximization and the act of choice. Econometrica 65, 745–779.
Suppes, P., 1966. Some formal models of the grading principle. Synthese 6, 284–306.
44
